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Article

How to Fix Unpaid Arbitration Awards
Per Jebsen*
Investors face many perils when they entrust their savings with an
errant brokerage firm or broker. The hazards are often limited primarily
by ingenuity: the firm or broker may put the money in unsuitable
investments, squander it through excessive trading, or simply steal it
outright. Even after the misuse is detected, the investor must bring a
claim, proceed through arbitration, and obtain a favorable verdict. But a
painful obstacle may be reserved for last: in a significant fraction of
cases, an investor with a duly obtained award is simply never paid,
usually because the errant brokerage firm or broker has gone out of
business. As recently as four years ago, one out of three arbitration
awards was never paid, and up to one-half of the award amounts went
unsatisfied.' Since then, apparently because of new rules imposed by
regulators, these rates may have been halved.2 Nonetheless, for many
investors, the arbitration payment process has a casino-like quality:
usually you get paid, but every sixth time, you do not. These investors,
having potentially put at stake their life savings, are denied satisfaction
of their duly-obtained awards because they were unable to perceive in

* Per Jebsen is a Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars. The author
would like to thank Jill Gross for her helpful comments and support, without which this
Article would not have been possible. Errors and opinions are the author's responsibility
alone.
1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON MATTERS RELATING TO
SECURITIEs ARBITRATION,

GAO-03-162R, at 3 (Apr. 11, 2003), available at http:/www.

gao.gov/new.items/d03162r.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2003].
2. See A Review of the Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on CapitalMarkets, Ins. and Gov't-SponsoredEnter., H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 109th Cong.
1 (2005) (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg, President, NASD Dispute Resolution), http://
financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=all&comm=1 (follow Mar. 17, 2005
hyperlink) [hereinafter Hearing].
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advance something that also eluded regulators; namely, that a particular
broker-dealer was destined in one, two or more years to fail.
This Article focuses on how to fix the problem of unpaid securities
arbitration awards. Arbitration, a more informal approach to dispute
resolution that securities firms almost always make mandatory for
individual investors, has attracted much commentary as to whether it is
fair and efficient.3 The arbitration payment process has been the subject
of far less scrutiny.4 Yet, as an objective matter, it is unfair and
inefficient in the sense that, year after year, a noteworthy number of
investors who have been vindicated never receive the money to which
they are entitled. The Article examines why the situation deserves to be
remedied and proposes solutions that would take the non-payment rate as
close as possible to zero.
Section A of this Article sets forth and discusses data concerning
the extent of unpaid awards. Section B describes the steps that have been
taken (principally) by NASD, a self-regulatory organization (SRO) that
regulates America's securities industry, 5 to reduce unpaid awards since

3. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do
Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415 (2003); Barbara
Black & Jill Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities
Arbitration, 23 CARDoZO L. REV. 991 (2002); David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and
Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1101 (1998); Joel Seligman, The
Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L. REV.
327 (1996).
4. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon, Securities Arbitration: Bankrupt,
Bothered & Bewildered, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 131 (2002), discuss both unpaid
awards and the lack of written reasons given for the factual and legal basis to an
arbitration award. More generally, commentators have noted a comparative dearth of
academic literature with respect to either the Net Capital Rule or SIPA, which are
discussed at length in this Article. E.g., Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised
Article 8 and the Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615, 678 n.348 (2000) ("The
law review literature that focuses on the uniform net capital rules is even less extensive
than that for the SIPC."); Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities
Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1074 n.7 (1999) (referring to academic literature addressing the SIPA
scheme as "limited"). (With respect to written reasons, NASD has filed with the SEC a
proposed rule change allowing customers to require a written explanation of the
arbitration panel's decision. E.g., Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration
Awards Upon the Request of Customers, or of Associated Persons in Industry
Controversies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52009, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (July 15,
2005)).
5. NASD is "the primary private-sector regulator of America's securities industry."
NASD, About NASD, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE
&nodeld=608 (last visited Dec. 11, 2005).
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the issuance of several reports earlier in this decade by the United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) examining the problem.6
Section C lays out several arguments as to why the problem of unpaid
awards should be fixed. Section D considers approaches to reducing the
problem that would go beyond those fixes that have been implemented.
Finally, Section E provides a conclusion.
Among other arguments, Section C asserts that allowing arbitration
awards to remain unpaid has the potential to undermine investor
confidence and is, in any case, a blemish on the reputation of the U.S.
capital markets. The Section also suggests that ignoring the problem
amounts to shifting the burden for regulatory failure with respect to
defunct broker-dealers to those least able to shoulder the burden:
individual investors essentially chosen at random.
Section D examines several approaches to reducing the rate of
unpaid arbitration awards. These approaches are: (1) establishing an
SRO-administered fund or imposing an insurance or bond-posting
requirement; (2) making stricter aspects of a rule established by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that is known as the "Net
Capital Rule"; 7 and (3) expanding the duties of the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), the non-profit corporation that in certain
instances oversees the liquidation of failed broker-dealers. The Section
also discusses considerations that would apply in drafting statutory
language to give SIPC the ability to cover unpaid awards.
In particular, this Article emphasizes an increased role for SIPC. It
does so for several reasons. SIPC's enabling statute, the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), 8 was born of a desire to restore
investor confidence shaken by the failure of broker-dealers, and thus has

6. U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO

ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS, GAO/GGD-00- 115 (June 15, 2000), available

at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg0O115.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2000]; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EVALUATION OF STEPS TAKEN TO ADDRESS

UNPAID

ARBITRATION

AWARDS,

GAO-01-654R

(Apr.

27,

THE PROBLEM OF

2001),

available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01654r.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2001]; GAO 2003. (At the
time these reports were issued, GAO was called the United States Government
Accounting Office.). Each of the reports states that it was written in response to requests
from Congressmen John D. Dingell and Edward J. Markey. E.g., GAO 2000 at 1 (stating
that the report was written in response to requests from Dingell and Markey dated as of
July 30, 1998 and September 23, 1998). In addition to the GAO reports, this Article has
benefited from the article by Thomas W. Joo, supra note 4.
7. Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2005).
8. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78111 (2005).
SIPC's status as a non-profit "membership" corporation is provided for at § 78ccc(a).
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a genesis similar to that which would stimulate reducing unpaid awards.
Second, SIPA elevates for special treatment a class of claims that
pertain to investors and failed broker-dealers, and therefore creates a
"precedent" for doing so again. Third, SIPC's established competence in
liquidating failed broker-dealers to satisfy certain claims of individual
investors makes it a logical candidate for administering unpaid awards.
Finally, SIPC already possesses a sizeable fund that could be tapped, and
readily augmented, in order to appropriately compensate individual
investors with such awards.
A. Unpaid Awards Remain a Significant Problem
In 1998, about 64% of NASD-administered arbitration awards were
not fully paid.9 Also in that year, about 80% of the $161 million
awarded to investors in all forums, but almost entirely NASD, went
unpaid.l°

The non-payment rate then dropped: in 2001, about 33% of NASDadministered awards were not fully paid, and about 55% of the $100.2
million awarded was unpaid." The reduced rate of non-payment may
have reflected new NASD award-monitoring procedures introduced
since 1998 or a difference of methodologies used to measure the rate: the

9. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 34; GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9. NASD
administers the great majority of arbitration cases. In 1998, NASD arbitrators decided
92% of customer-initiated arbitration cases, while New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
arbitrators decided 6%. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 24-25. In 2004, there were 8,201
NASD arbitration cases filed compared with 1,002 NYSE cases filed. NASD, Dispute
Resolution Statistics, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&
nodeld=516&ssSourceNodeld=12 (last visited Dec. 11, 2005) [hereinafter NASD,
Dispute Resolution Statistics]; NYSE, 2004 Arbitration Statistics, http://www.nyse.com
/Frameset.html?displayPage=/arbitration/1022221393057.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2005). Other arbitration forums include the American Arbitration Association, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange, and the Pacific Exchange. GAO 2000, supra note 6,
at 25. Not only does NASD administer most arbitration cases, but nearly all, or all of the
cases involving unpaid awards, arise in NASD arbitrations. Id. at 5, 7. "Securities
regulations require every broker-dealer ... [with] public customers to register with, and
be a member of, NASD." Id. at 26. Thus, "NASD members include the newer, less
established or less capitalized broker-dealers" while "NYSE members must be able to
pay the [potentially million-dollar plus] cost of a seat on the exchange." Id.
10. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 34; GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9.
11. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 3. In 2001, out of the 236 awards that were not
fully paid, nothing was paid on 216 of the awards and 20 of the awards were partially
paid. Id. at 9. Of the approximately $55 million that was not paid in 2001, about $12
million was not due because "respondents had requested a hearing, filed for bankruptcy,
or filed a motion to vacate." Id. at 3.
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1998 figures were based on a GAO survey while the 2001 figures were
based on NASD data.1 2 In 2002, about 30% of NASD arbitration awards
were not fully paid, according to one estimate.1 3 The great majority of
unpaid awards are the result of broker-dealers leaving the industry.' 4
The most recent publicly-available figure for the extent of unpaid
arbitration awards is that about 15% of NASD arbitration awards through
the first half of 2004 went unpaid.1 5 It is unclear, however, whether this
figure reflects only awards that were completely unpaid, or includes
those that were partially paid. 16 It is also unclear how much of the
aggregate award amount went unpaid for the time period. The 15%
figure, if it holds for the rest of 2004, would suggest that the rate of
unpaid awards on a per-award basis has been halved from 2001. NASD
attributes the improvement to steps it has taken to reduce unpaid
awards.1 7 (These steps are described below in Section B.)
However, even with an apparently reduced rate of unpaid awards,
the increased numbers of arbitration cases and award amounts, which
may reflect the bull market and its aftermath, suggest that as an absolute
matter, the problem has remained particularly significant through 2004.
A review of NASD statistics is illustrative. Total arbitration cases filed

12. Id. The 1998 figures had a sampling error of plus or minus 7 or 8%. GAO
2000, supra note 6, at 34.
13. Securities Industry Association, Arbitration is Fair, Fast, And Economical for
Investors (updated on Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.sia.com/press/pdf/Arbitration
TalkingPoints2003.pdf [hereinafter SIA, Arbitration]. The SIA release states that GAO is
set to issue a report "that is expected to show a significant drop in the percentage of
unpaid arbitration awards." Id.
14. In 2001, 192 out of 236 awards that were not fully paid were attributed to
brokers that had terminated their NASD membership. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9. A
more recently provided statistic is that with respect to about 85% of unpaid awards, "the
party responsible for the damages was a broker-dealer firm or individual broker that had
left the securities industry." Hearing,supra note 2 (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg).
15. GAO 2003 recommends that NASD provide data on the extent of the nonpayment rate on its website. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 3. This recommendation was
seconded by the Securities and Exchange Commission, id. at 18, and by Congressmen
John Dingell and Edward Markey in a letter commenting on GAO 2003. Letter from
John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, and Edward J.
Markey, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet, to William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC and Linda D. Fienberg, President, NASD Dispute Resolution
(May 12, 2003), http://www.house.gov/commerce democrats/press/index.shtml#letters.
16. Partially-paid awards comprised almost one-fifth of the total given for the 1998
not-fully-paid figure. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 34. Partially-paid awards dropped to
under 9% for the 2001 not-fully-paid figure. See GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9 (noting
that, in 2001, out of 236 awards that were not fully paid, 20 were partially paid).
17. Hearing,supra note 2 (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg).
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rose to 8201 in 2004 and 8945 in 2003 from 6915 in 2001.18 Arbitration
cases closed rose to 9209 in 2004 from 5582 in 2001. Cases decided by
arbitrators rose to 2423 in 2004, up from 1669 in 2001.19 All customer
cases decided rose to 2019 in 2004 from 1365 in 2001, and customer
cases with damage awards rose from 725 in 2001 to 1113 in 2004.20
Finally, total damages awarded rose to $194 million in 2004, up from
$97 million in 2001.21
A 15% non-payment rate, to the extent it related solely to the figure
for customer cases with damage awards, would mean that about 167
investors or investor households (assuming no single investor or investor
household had multiple unpaid awards), after having identified a misuse,
proceeded through arbitration, and received a favorable judgment, had
nonetheless failed to receive the award (or had only received part of the
award) to which they were entitled. Thus, while the non-payment rate
may have been halved since 2001, on an absolute basis, the number of
unpaid awards has been reduced by a little less than one third.2 2 (And, of
course, the 15% non-payment rate is a provisional figure for the first half
of 2004.) Furthermore, for each of these approximately 167 investors,
the unpaid award amount is likely to have been personally significant:
the average award amount for 2004 was about $174,000.23
18. NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 9. This year, the number of
new case filings through October has dropped from 7010 to 5017 for the same period last
year. Id.
19. Id. NASD figures show that 1073 of the cases closed in 2004 were resolved for
catchall reasons including "bankruptcy of critical party," indicating that the figure for
cases with damage awards might have been higher but for these bankruptcies. Id.
20. NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics (as updated for Mar. 2005) (copy on file
with author). The statistics update for October shows that "all customer claimant cases
decided" (emphasis supplied) rose to 1894 in 2004 from 1172 in 2001, and that "all
customer claimant cases" (emphasis supplied) with damage awards rose to 888 in 2004
from 637 in 2001. NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 9. These figures
were apparently not provided in NASD's update for March. The October update notes
that the "[p]ercentage of customer claimant award cases has been recalculated to reflect
only instances in which investors as claimants recovered monetary damages or nonmonetary relief." Id.
21. NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics (as updated for March 2005) (copy on file
with author). NASD's website apparently did not provide damage award figures in its
statistics update for October. See NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 9.
22. As mentioned above in notes 11, 14, there were 236 awards that were not fully
paid in 2001. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9. To the extent that there has been a drop in
the number of arbitration cases in 2005, see supra note 18, then the reduction in the
number of unpaid awards on an absolute basis is likely to have been greater this year than
last.
23. In 2004, a total of $194 million was awarded in 1113 customer cases. Supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/8
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Moreover, in 2001, as in 1998, the rate of unpaid aggregate award
amounts was higher than the rate of unpaid cases (in other words, the
overall amount of money not collected was greater as a fraction of the
whole than the number of unpaid cases). 24 Applying the 15% nonpayment ratio to a 2004 total damages figure of $194 million would yield
25
an annual aggregate non-payment amount of roughly $29 million.
However, if the ratio in 2001 between unpaid award amounts and unpaid
cases (either slightly more than or just under one half to slightly less than
one third) 26 were to have persisted in 2004, then about one quarter of the
aggregate amount would have been unpaid, or roughly $48.5 million.
That figure is not much less than the $55 million that went unpaid in
200 1.27 (Also, a higher proportion of unpaid award amounts may indicate
that the average unpaid award amount might have been even higher than
$174,000.)
Another way of considering the 15% non-payment rate is that it
diminishes an element of the argument that the arbitration process is fair.
A statistic that has been cited is that in about 55%, or more than half, of
arbitration cases, investors receive an award.28 However, when unpaid
awards are included, the statistic for investor compensation drops to less
than half, or about 47%.29
In other words, even now, after the NASD has implemented steps to
reduce the number and amount of unpaid awards, less than half of
investors who proceed through arbitration are actually paid for their
24.
awarded
or about
at 34.
25.

"In 2001 about 55%, or $55 million, of the $100.2 million NASD arbitrators
to investors was unpaid." GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9. In 1998, about 80%,
$129 million of the $161 million awarded was unpaid. GAO 2000, supra note 6,
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

26. The exact fraction for the 2001 unpaid award amount depends on how one treats
the $12 million figure that was not required to be paid. If all of the $12 million is
subtracted from the $55 million that was required to be paid, then the percentage of
unpaid awards is 43%, which is still significantly higher than the less-than one-third ratio

for unpaid cases. However, of this $12 million, at least some part of it was unpaid for
reasons-i.e., bankruptcy-that were beyond the control of investors, and thus the
percentage of unpaid awards would be higher. See GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 3 n.6.
27. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 9.
28. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg). SIA, Arbitration,
supra note 13 (noting 54% payment rate through December 2003 for that year).
29. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the 15% non-payment rate from the total
of paid awards and adding it to the figure for unpaid awards. Figures currently provided
on NASD's website suggest that customers receive awards in just 47% of arbitration
cases, and that therefore, once the 15% non-payment rate is factored in, the statistic for
investor compensation would drop to about 40%. See NASD, Dispute Resolution
Statistics, supra notes 9, 20.
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claims. And, of course, given that non-payment rates were higher in
previous years, the figure for awards with actual payment would be even
less when calculated over a recent multi-year span. Finally, nonpayment statistics may fail to capture the extent of the problem given that
the likelihood of non-payment, which presumably would be apparent
where a broker-dealer is failing or has failed, would deter lawyers from
taking a case. 30
B. Unpaid Awards Persist Despite NASD Steps to Address Problem
NASD has taken a wide variety of steps to improve the arbitration
payment process since the issuance of GAO 2000. 3 1 Thus, apparently
during 2000, both NASD and the SEC on their websites began to caution
investors against the dangers of an unpaid award.32 In September 2000,
30. See GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 10. See also Hearing,supra note 2 (testimony
of Rosemary Shockman, President, Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association)
("Abused investors often cannot find lawyers to represent them in cases against brokerdealers when the ability to collect is uncertain.") Proponents of arbitration note that
many cases are settled prior to arbitration and that investors receive compensation when
they do settle. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg); see also SIA,
Arbitration, supra note 13.
31. Most but not all of these steps are summarized in GAO 2003, supra note 1, at
11. In GAO 2000, GAO recommended that NASD take several actions to rectify the
problem of unpaid awards. These included requesting that the parties to arbitration
inform NASD by the end of the 30-day payment period about the payment status of any
monetary award. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 45. In the report, GAO said NASD had
committed to undertake various initiatives to encourage prompt payment of unpaid
awards. Id. These initiatives were: (1) require member firms to notify NASDR when
they have satisfied an award; (2) require that claimants notify ODR if they haven't been
paid; (3) propose to NASD Board that a firm that has been terminated, suspended or
barred be prohibited from enforcing a pre-dispute arbitration agreement clause; (4) advise
claimants in writing of the status of a firm so that they can evaluate whether to continue
with arbitration; and (5) propose a rule amendment to provide default proceedings where
the terminated or defunct member or associated person doesn't answer or appear, but the
claimant affirmatively elects to pursue arbitration. Id. at 67-68.
32. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 12. In its report, GAO said NASD and SEC began
these website cautions following a GAO request made in June 2000. NYSE has included
information regarding unpaid awards in its Users Guide to Arbitration, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Guidelns2.pdf; see also GAO 2001, supra note 6, at 5 (noting
that NYSE had made information available in its Users Guide). The NYSE otherwise
apparently has not taken steps comparable to NASD. Cf GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 18
(appended letter from SEC noting NASD rule changes and stating that NYSE (and SEC
and NASD) educational materials had been amended to reflect risk of unpaid awards, but
making no mention of any further NYSE steps). Presumably, this is because the NYSE
has not had a significant problem with unpaid awards, which in turn would reflect the
greater capitalization of NYSE members. See supra note 9. For its 1998 survey, GAO
agreed that the NYSE had not had any unpaid awards. See GAO 2000, supra note 6, at

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/8
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NASD required broker-dealers to certify that they have paid or otherwise
complied with an award against them within 30 days after the award has
been served; and it also began to ask claimants who won awards to notify
it if an award has not been satisfied.33
In April 2001, NASD, with SEC approval, amended its code of
arbitration procedure to preclude a suspended broker-dealer from
enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement in NASD's arbitration
forum.34 In June 2001, NASD began to advise claimants in writing of
the status of broker-dealers so that the claimants could evaluate whether
to continue with the arbitration. 35 In July 2002, the SEC approved a
proposed NASD rule change providing for streamlined default
proceedings against a defunct broker-dealer who does not appear.3 6
Also, NASD officials said they had begun reviewing arbitration claims
as they arrived, so as to identify potentially troublesome members.37
More recently, in February 2004, the SEC approved various NASD
rule amendments whose effects included making it more difficult for
firms to avoid their arbitration payment obligations. 38 Also, in June
47; see also id. at 35, and accompanying text (discussing whether an award had been
partially paid); id. at 73-74 (appended letter from NYSE stating that award had been fully
paid).
33. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 10.
34. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by NASD, Inc. Relating to
Amendments to Rule 10301 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure to Prohibit Terminated,
Suspended, Barred or Otherwise Defunct Firms From Enforcing Predispute Arbitration
Agreements in the NASD Arbitration Forum, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44158, 66
Fed. Reg. 19,267 (Apr. 6, 2001).
35. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 11.
36. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Situations in Which a Suspended, Terminated, or
Otherwise Defunct Member or Associate Person Fails to Answer or Participate in an
Arbitration Proceeding, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46221, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,237 (July
17, 2002). See GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 11.
37. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 11 (It is not clear from GAO 2003 when this
began).
38. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change by the NASD, Inc. to
Amend Rules 1011, 1014 and 1017, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48969, 68 Fed. Reg.
75,681 (Dec. 22, 2003). ,NASD announced that it had approved the proposed
amendments for comment on August 6, 2002. News Release, NASD, NASD Board
Approves Proposed Amendments to Strengthen Authority in Member Application
Reviews (Aug. 6, 2002), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS GET PAGE
&ssDocName=NASDW 002919. Among the amendments, NASD clarified that pending
arbitration claims against an applicant are considered as part of the application process,
and created a new standard of admission explicitly identifying as decisional criteria
unpaid arbitration awards. NASD, Membership Application and Continuation Rules,
Notice to Members 04-10, at 94 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.nasd.com
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2004, the SEC approved NASD by-law amendments that would allow
NASD to institute suspension hearings within two years against a former
broker seeking to reenter the securities industry when that broker has
failed to pay awards. 39 Indeed, to the extent that NASD has omitted to
take steps with respect to unpaid awards, the most discernible omission is
a failure to make
readily available better statistics delineating the extent
40
problem.
the
of
As mentioned, an NASD official has stated that the halving of the
non-payment rate achieved in the first half of 2004 reflects the success of
the steps NASD has taken. 4'
C. Why It Makes Sense to Reduce Non-Payment of Arbitration Awards
Before determining how best to reduce or eliminate non-payment of
arbitration awards, it is useful to consider why one should do so. Several
rationales suggest themselves.
First, even though the non-payment rate has been decreased, the
incidence of unpaid awards remains sizeable. As described in Section A,
/web/idcplg?ldcService=SS GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW003276&ssSourceNo
deld=467 (follow "View FulI Notice" hyperlink).
39. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change by NASD, Inc. Regarding
Failure to Pay Arbitration Awards, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49845, 69 Fed. Reg.
33,968 (June 10, 2004). More generally, NASD and SEC have acted on various
recommendations from GAO on how better to inform investors of SIPC's policies. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: UPDATE ON
MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, GAO-03-

811, (July 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03811.pdf [hereinafter
GAO SIPC UPDATE].

40. Among the statistics that would help inform a discussion concerning unpaid
arbitration awards are the following: (a) exactly how many awards have gone unpaid for
each year since 2001; (b) how many awards have been partially paid; (c) a breakdown of
when these awards arose (e.g., prior to bankruptcy, arising prior to but concluded after
bankruptcy, or arising after and concluded after bankruptcy); (d) to the extent that the
awards had arisen because of a broker termination of its NASD membership, whether the
broker had self-liquidated, self-liquidated under NASD auspices, or been liquidated under
SIPC auspices; (e) whether the unpaid award pertained to a clearing or an introducing
firm; and (f) the size of the brokerage firm to which the unpaid award related (if it related
to a firm rather than an individual), measured by criteria such as revenues.
41. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg). In Congressional
testimony earlier this year, NASD Dispute Resolution President Linda Fienberg pointed
to the following changes among others as having led to the improvement in the nonpayment rate: (a) requiring brokerage firms to certify compliance with awards within 30
days; (b) asking investors to notify NASD if awards have not been paid; (c) requiring
brokerage firms to certify that their employees have paid their awards; (d) beginning of
suspension proceedings within 30 days from the date the award is issued absent certain
steps by the firm or individual broker; and (e) streamlined default proceedings. Id.
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about 167 investors or investor households will not have been paid for
awards made in 2004, based on extrapolated figures. This number is, as
an absolute matter, only one third less than the number of unpaid awards
four years ago.42 The losses from these unpaid awards are likely to have
been significant to these investors or investor households assuming an
average award size of $174,000. 4 ' The problem may be greater than the
statistics indicate to the extent that some lawyers are or have been
deterred from taking cases because of the very prospect of nonpayment.44 Moreover, even if the provisionally reduced arbitration
award non-payment rate more closely approximates any typical nonpayment rate for judicial judgments, arguments presented in this section
(e.g., preserving confidence in the capital markets, immediately below)
support seeking to further diminish the arbitration non-payment rate.4 5
Second, non-payment of a significant fraction of unpaid awards has
the potential to undermine confidence in the capital markets and in the
processes of investor justice. Permitting continued non-payments
provides an unfortunate contrast with efforts to make the arbitration
process fair and efficient and constitutes a waste of NASD resources. 46
Non-payment undermines the promise of improved arbitral process
implicit in cases such as Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,47 the
Supreme Court case that upheld the enforceability of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in broker-customer contracts. 48
42. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (The ongoing decline in the number
of arbitration cases in 2005 from 2004 suggests that on an absolute basis the reduction in
the number of unpaid awards would be greater in 2005 than in 2004).
43. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
44. See supranote 30 and accompanying text.
45. It would be worthwhile to compare the non-payment rate for arbitration awards
with non-payment rates for various types of judicial judgments. It seems likely that the
33% non-payment rate for 2001 (number of awards) would exceed such rates for many
types of judicial judgments (or such judgments generally). At the provisional 2004 rate
of 15%, however, such assurance may prove to be less warranted. As an initial matter,
the inquiry would need to establish the comparability of different categories of nonpayment rates (e.g., unpaid awards versus other forms of (mainly) bankruptcy-generated
non-payment rates, or unpaid awards versus judicial judgments concerning brokerage
firms). In any case, as this section suggests, even if the arbitration non-payment rate is
similar to or less than other non-payment rates, several compelling arguments exist for
remedying the arbitration rate, such as preserving confidence in and enhancing the
reputation of the U.S. capital markets, or compensating for defects in a regulatorsanctioned arbitration system.
46. GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 13.
47. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
48. The McMahon court in part rested its holding on a reassessment of a prior
decision, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Court stated that "the mistrust of
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Third, reducing the non-payment rate to near-zero would benefit the
image of the U.S. capital markets, often touted as the best in the world.4 9
Such action would contribute to the restoration of trust in the markets
shaken by corporate accounting and Wall Street scandals.50 Moreover,
making absolutely sure the arbitration process works as well as possible
might foster increased public participation in shareholding, which
benefits the securities industry.5' Industry participants praise arbitration
as superior to judicial litigation. 52 A perfected arbitral system would
improve their case. (One can more readily demonstrate why arbitration is
preferable if the payment rate for arbitration awards is provably better [as
opposed to on par with or worse] than for judicial judgments.)
arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with
the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time." McMahon, 482 U.S. at
233. The McMahon court also reasoned that "[e]ven if Wilko's assumptions regarding
arbitration were valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they do not hold true
today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority." Id. In
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the Court
vacated Wilko. Id. at 484. The Court said: "To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion
of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement
of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes." Id. at 481.
49. Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient CapitalMarkets, CorporateDisclosure, and
Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004) (examining challenge posed by Enron scandal to
widely held beliefs that the U.S. corporate governance and disclosure systems are the best
in the world, and that the U.S. capital markets are highly efficient).
50. Cf, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of
FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004) (asserting "gatekeeper"
failure as reason for wave of accounting and financial scandals surfacing in 2001-2002);
Jon Jordan, Corporate Issuers Beware: Schering-Plough and Recent SEC Enforcement
Actions Signal Vigorous Enforcement of Regulation FD, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751, 774
(2004) (noting that Enron scandal caused massive loss of investor confidence in
marketplace); but c.f Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546 (2005) (describing how
massive market decline had preceded enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation but
questioning value of such legislation to investors).
51. Cf INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO MEMBERS 9
(2005) (noting that mutual fund industry's success rests on the confidence of the 92
million shareholders, representing half of all the nation's households, that have entrusted
more than $7.5 trillion to mutual funds), available at http://www.ici.org (follow
"Statements & Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Annual Reports & Policy Papers"
hyperlink). Research reports profiling equity ownership available on the Investment
Company Institute's website include INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE AND THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (2005), available at
http://www.ici.org (follow "Statements & Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Research
Newsletters & Reports" hyperlink).
52. E.g., Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Mark Lackritz, President of the
Securities Industry Association) ("Arbitration continues to be a far more efficient and
cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism than traditional court-based litigation.").
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Fourth, allowing a significant fraction of arbitration awards to
remain unpaid amounts to unfair burden-shifting of the consequences of
Regulators, not individual investors, supervise
regulatory failure.
broker-dealers; and regulators, not individual investors, are charged with
53
attempting to forestall or warn of impending broker-dealer delinquency.
Yet randomly chosen individual investors currently must shoulder the
financial burden when bankruptcy occurs, even after they have pursued
regulator-sanctioned arbitral procedures.
Arguing against fixes to the non-payment problem on the basis of
cost to broker-dealers or investors in the aggregate amounts to a
willingness to let losses stemming from imperfections in the regulatory
scheme rest with a few unlucky investors. This willingness is unfair
because these few investors are the least able to guard against the
imperfections (and may even be unaware of their existence).54
Moreover, even as these investors suffer losses that are likely to be
personally significant, the scheme that has led to their losses confers
55
many benefits on broker-dealers and investors in the aggregate.
Furthermore, cost-based arguments are less compelling to the extent that
the non-payment problem recently has been reduced somewhat in size.
Fifth, enough time has passed to gauge the effectiveness of NASD's
reforms initiated since the issuance of the GAO reports. For instance,
more than four years have passed since approval of precluding brokerdealers from enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses, and more than
three years have passed since streamlining of default proceedings.5 6
Every increment of time that passes without further solutions consigns
some number of individual investors to frustrated hopes of financial
recompense. Each month, even with the reduced rate of non-payment,
about fourteen investors or investor households are, on average, unable
to recover losses averaging much more than $100,000.
Sixth, further "easy" improvements, those that do not involve actual
compensation, may well be beyond the reach of regulators. NASD may
53. For example, under the "Early Warning Rule," whenever any securities
exchange or NASD learns that a member has failed to file a notice or report required by
the rule, it must give notice to the SEC of this failure. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 8-B-lc(iii) (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter Loss & SELIGMAN]. This

rule is discussed infra at notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31511, 57 Fed. Reg.
56,973, 1992 SEC LEXIS 3163 at *11 (Nov. 24, 1992) (customers of broker-dealers are
"in most instances, incapable of assessing the financial condition of custodian firms.").
55. See generally infra Section D.3.c.
56. See generally Section B.
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have exhausted the effective procedural steps it can take. 7 For instance,
as a hypothetical example, shortening the 30-day notification of nonpayment period may be impractical and achieve little at the margin.
Moreover, NASD's rule amendments seem on their face to be
comprehensive and well thought out. Thus, to reduce the 15% nonpayment rate to near-zero at this point requires compensatory, as
opposed to "procedural," solutions.
Seventh, fixing the problem of unpaid awards is unlikely to create
an unwanted "moral hazard" effect, in which, for instance, investors fail
to exercise appropriate scrutiny of the broker-dealers they select or make
ill-advised, risky investments. 8 As a general matter, individual investors
may fail to apply much scrutiny in the first place, especially with respect
to broker selection (and thus any moral hazard would produce no greater
absence of scrutiny on their part). Moreover, investors may have been
lulled into a false sense of security with respect to the solvency of
particular broker-dealers for reasons unrelated to a guarantee of arbitral
payment, such as a broker-dealers' use of the SIPC logo. 59 Furthermore,
exercising the appropriate degree of scrutiny, sufficient in advance to
reliably detect which broker-dealers will fail, may be impossible for
individual investors. 60 Thus, imposing a "market discipline" of potential
non-payment, in the hope of conditioning investors not to choose poorly
capitalized broker-dealers, is unwarranted and likely to prove ineffective.
Finally, it seems unlikely that investors would opt for riskier investments
57. Moreover, NASD has argued that the problem of unpaid awards is not specific
to the SRO-administered arbitration system but rather is a collection problem with respect
to defunct firms that would exist when investors bring their claims to court. GAO 2000,
supra note 6, at 66.
58. "Moral hazard" is "the economic principle, fundamental to insurance ... that a
person or firm that is insured against a risk has an incentive, unless blocked by contract
or law, to increase that risk if it will increase his income or reduce his costs, since he will
get to keep the benefit of the greater risk while the insurer will bear the costs." Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Schumacher Elec. Corp., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14318, at *6 (7th Cir.
2005); see also, e.g., A.M.I. Diamonds Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 528, 530 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("Moral hazard refers to the effect of insurance in causing the insured to relax
the care he takes to safeguard his property because the loss will be borne in whole or part
by the insurance carrier."); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J.
ECON. 541 (1979).
59. See Joo, supra note 4, at 1123 (noting that brokers' use of the SIPC insignia
may lull investors into a false sense of security); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: STEPS NEEDED TO BETTER DISCLOSE SIPC POLICIES

TO INVESTORS, GAO-01-653, at Ch. 5 (May 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/d01653.pdf [hereinafter GAO SIPC STEPS] (noting that investors may confuse
SIPC protections with other financial guarantee programs).
60. See Net Capital Rule, supra note 54.
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simply, or even in substantial part, because they knew that they would be

paid (a) if they reached the point where they entered into arbitration and
won an award and (b) the broker proved incapable of paying. (One can
imagine more immediate reasons for selecting riskier investments, such
as a desire for higher returns.) Normative judgments of whether
investors engaged in reckless investing behavior (or even broker
selection) are best left to the arbitral process itself, rather than being

imposed in a random and draconian fashion once this process has been
concluded.61

Eighth, because arbitration awards in some instances arise out of an
involuntarily chosen dispute-resolution process, greater care should be
directed towards defects in this process such as non-payment of awards.
Arbitration is in effect forced upon investors through broker-dealer
imposed standard form contracts. Investors cannot employ the services
of broker-dealers unless they agree to arbitration in the event of
62
Moreover, the most active arbitration forums are administered
dispute.
by self-regulating organizations such as NASD, which directs many
aspects of broker-dealer behavior. In general, the courts and NASD
itself have held that NASD does not constitute a "state actor" whose
authority is synonymous with that of the government. 63 Yet, while the
federal government may not as a legal matter bear responsibility for the

61. To the extent that a "moral hazard" effect is possible, it seems most likely to
occur with respect to whether investors would avail themselves of the regulatory fixes
implemented by NASD, such as notification to NASD when a claim has not been
satisfied. Knowing that an award would ultimately be paid, investors and/or their
advocates might feel less inclined to take any intermediate steps, and their failure to do so
might increase costs at the margin.
62. See Hearing,supra note 2 (testimony of Rosemary Shockman); Constantine N.
Katsoris, The Resolution of Securities Disputes, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 307, 357
(2001); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities
Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255, 324 (1998) ("[C]ustomers must submit all claims to
arbitration, or they may not open accounts with brokerage houses."); Richard E. Speidel,
Symposium, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon, Contract Theory and
Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. Rev. 1335 (1996). Cf Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174
(1983) (discussing form contracts).
63. E.g., Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002) ("It is clear
that NASD is not a state actor and its requirement of mandatory arbitration is not state
action."); D.L. Cromwell Ivs. v. NASD Regulation Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir.
2002); Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999). In Fairness in Securities
Arbitration:A ConstitutionalMandate?,26 PACE L. REV. 73 (2005), Sarah Rudolph Cole
argues that while federal courts have concluded that no state action is present in securities
arbitration, SROs are nonetheless state actors when they require employees to participate
in arbitration of employment disputes. Id.
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plight of investors with unpaid awards, from a broad policy perspective,
the government has permitted the creation of the regulatory framework
that leads to the outcome of non-payment. 64
In other words, the government has created the regulatory
framework for one of its key functions, overseeing the securities markets,
that has led to the NASD-supervised arbitration approach in which, as a
predictable matter, some investors never recoup savings that were lost
because of their trust in NASD-supervised broker-dealers. To this
extent, the government bears a responsibility for the plight of investors
with unpaid awards to a degree that is absent from run-of-the-mill claims
on the general estate of a bankrupt company or broker-dealer. This
responsibility attaches even if the arbitration system operates more
reliably or produces better outcomes than judicial litigation in securing
awards because arbitration is mandatory.65
NASD's adoption of a rule prohibiting defunct broker-dealers from
enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses cures much but not all of the
unfairness in imposing on investors a compulsory process with a
predictable outcome of non-payment. In approving the rule, regulators
stated that defunct firms had a "significantly higher incidence of nonpayment of arbitration awards than do active finns." 66 However,
"active" or non-defunct firms are, under the rule, still able to enforce predispute arbitration clauses, and thus the overall system in this non-trivial
respect retains its involuntary character with respect to individual
investors. Moreover, it is unclear, at least from the written discussions
underpinning regulators' adoption of the rule, whether the higher
64. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2005); expresses a policy judgment

against disfavoring arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("By enacting § 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act], we have several

times said, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect
status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other
contracts. "'(citation omitted)).
65. For a discussion of whether the law continues to play a role in the resolution of
brokers' customer disputes despite the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses,
see Barbara Black & Jill Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in
SecuritiesArbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2002). Black and Gross also comment
on the relative merits of arbitration and judicial litigation, and note that investors "may
well be better off in a[n] [arbitration] system where less attention is paid to the law and
more to the equities of the actual dispute before the arbitration panel." Id. at 995.
66. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by NASD, Inc. Relating to
Amendments to Rule 10301 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure to Prohibit Terminated,
Suspended, Barred or Otherwise Defunct Firms From Enforcing Predispute Arbitration
Agreements in the NASD Arbitration Forum, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44158, 66
Fed. Reg. 19,267 (Apr. 6, 2001).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/8

16

2005]

UNPAID ARBITRA TION A WARDS

incidence of non-payment by defunct firms is in some measure
attributable to defunct firms that were in fact active at the time an
arbitration claim was brought.67 Said differently, because arbitration
takes a while, a firm may be active when a claim is brought but defunct
by the time a claim is ratified.
As regulators noted in approving the rule, the purpose of precluding
defunct firms from enforcing arbitration clauses is to give to investors
the option of availing "themselves of any judicial remedies available
under state law, including those that might prevent the dissipation of
assets.,68 Investors with claims against active broker-dealers might
equally desire to avail themselves of such remedies. 69 Their continued
to take special measures to address
inability to do so is another reason
70
the problem of unpaid awards.
D. Several Good Approaches Exist for Curtailing Unpaid Awards
Perhaps a final reason for fixing the problem of unpaid awards is
that several good approaches exist for doing so. In theory, any number
of methods could be devised to compensate investors. For instance,
67. Moreover, the data on which the rule is based is from GAO 2000, which cited
figures from 1998. See GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 33. Of course, as the 1998 data put
the arbitration non-payment problem as being worse than it was in 2001, this reliance
would tend to amplify the effect of the omission of active-to-inactive non-payment
figures. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
68. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the NASD, Inc. Relating to
Amendments to Rule 10301 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure to Prohibit Terminated,
Suspended, Barred or Otherwise Defunct Firms From Enforcing Predispute Arbitration
Agreements in the NASD Arbitration Forum, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44158, 66
Fed. Reg. at 19,267 (Apr. 6, 2001).
69. NASD notes that almost invariably investors with claims against defunct firms
have chosen the arbitration process over judicial litigation. Hearing, supra note 2
(testimony of Linda D. Fienberg). The investors' preference may well reflect the
superiority of arbitration over judicial litigation even with respect to securing assets. On
the other hand, it may also reflect considerations such as an inability of poorly funded
claimants to risk the greater upfront costs of judicial litigation, or even simply ignorance
of the existence of better measures for securing assets.
70. Again, it is possible, if the investors had not been forced into arbitration, and
had had the ability to opt for judicial litigation of the claims leading to their unpaid
awards, that they would have been able to employ a different toolset of remedies. This
different toolset might have led to a swifter outcome before a broker-dealer's failure, or
perhaps permitted some form of effective provisional remedy, such as attachment of
assets, that would have better secured their claim. Even if judicial litigation would not
provably have resulted in a better outcome, the foreclosure of a judicial option that might
have resulted in such an outcome is an arguable basis for justifying special treatment of
investors with unpaid awards.
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Congress could simply create a fund outright to satisfy unpaid awards.
The solutions that are discussed in this Section have already been
proposed by lawyers representing investors and rejected by the officials
whose views were summarized in the GAO reports. 7 1 As the discussion
will endeavor to show, the rejections were premature.
The potential steps are: (1) establishing a separate fund to cover
unpaid awards, to be administered by an SRO, or imposing insurance or
bonding requirements; (2) toughening the Net Capital Rule, which is
intended to ensure that broker-dealers have sufficient capital to liquidate
in an orderly fashion; and (3) broadening the responsibilities of SIPC to
include the payment of unpaid awards. These steps are considered in
turn.
1. EstablishingSRO-Administered Fund or Imposing Insuranceor
Bonding Requirement
One approach would be to establish a fund managed by an SRO,
presumably NASD as it oversees most securities arbitrations. 72 In the
proposal discussed in GAO 2000, the SRO fund would cover
compensatory as opposed to any punitive damages.7 3 The fund would be
variously financed with interest derived from the SIPC Fund,74 charges
on investor transactions, fees on broker-dealers, or funds obtained from
NASD money penalties. 75 Another approach would be to require brokerdealers to carry insurance or else post a bond for unpaid awards.76
Criticisms of the SRO-fund concept include that it would increase
broker-dealer and investor costs and lessen investor vigilance and, to the
71. GAO 2000 contains a relatively detailed discussion of possible solutions that

would compensate investors with unpaid arbitration awards. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at
39-43. The report summarizes the views of SEC, NASD, SIPC and other officials
dismissing these solutions. Id. at 40. GAO 2001 comments briefly on the insurance
proposal, and GAO 2003 comments further on this proposal and also on a possible
bonding requirement. GAO 2001, supra note 6, at 7-8; GAO 2003, supra note 1, at 1112.
72. See supra note 9.
73. Coverage would be limited to awards that were deemed "uncollectible" because
the liable party had left the securities industry. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 41.
74. The Fund finances SIPC's expenditures. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(a)(1) (2005). It is
discussed further infra at notes 242-59 and accompanying text.
75. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 41.
76. Id. at 43. A variation on the insurance proposal is, in addition to requiring
insurance, to make clearing firms (which carry customer accounts) liable for the acts of
introducing brokers. See GAO 2001, supra note 6, at 7; see also Cane & Greenspon,
supra note 4, at 139-41 (discussing insurance proposal).
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extent paid for from interest derived from the SIPC Fund, deplete the
fund's principal. 7 The critique of insurance or bonding is similar:
namely, that these requirements would increase costs of broker-dealers
industry-wide and ultimately to investors.7 Moreover, it is not clear how
much insurance would be needed and whether insurers would be willing
to underwrite the coverage. 79 Finally, insurance coverage80 would fail to
deter fraudulent practices or punish unscrupulous brokers.
These criticisms suffer from some of the general defects that
weaken arguments against reducing unpaid awards. For instance, while
providing for an SRO fund would increase costs to broker-dealers and/or
investors in the aggregate (assuming principally that they were to pay for
such a fund), the costs of unpaid awards are currently borne by an
unfortunate few investors. The rebuttal to cost-based criticisms of the
insurance or bonding requirements is likewise one of appropriate burdenshifting: who should pay for investor losses suffered at the hands of an
irresponsible broker-dealer that subsequently goes out of business?
While an insurance or a bonding requirement might in a general fashion
raise costs to broker-dealers or other investors, the costs of irresponsible
broker-dealer operations are currently being borne by randomly chosen
investors (not to mention other general creditors of these broker-dealers).
Also, well-capitalized, responsible brokers that are not at fault for
payment failures might nonetheless benefit, even if they were to shoulder
some additional burden because of a systemic solution, from the
increased investor confidence in the capital markets that would accrue if
the arbitration payment process were to be improved.
Establishing an SRO-administered fund or an insurance or bondingrequirement is unlikely to lessen investor vigilance, especially given the
inability of most investors to adequately predict a broker-dealer's future
solvency. Leaving the current system in place burdens comparatively
unsophisticated individual investors with a difficult, if not impossible,
fact-intensive inquiry every time they consider reposing their savings
with a broker-dealer. This misplaced burden (in which, theoretically,
investors are to differentiate between brokers based on their prospective
soundness) has the potential to erode investor confidence in the capital
markets, and inflicts possibly catastrophic financial loss on investors
otherwise adjudged to have legitimate claims. Related, the argument
77. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 41.

78. Id. at 43.
79. Id.
80. GAO 2001, supra note 6, at 8.
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against these potential solutions based on their inability to deter
fraudulent practices or punish unscrupulous brokers misconceives those
who properly should be charged with these tasks: regulators or the
industry as a whole, rather than a few, randomly-chosen investors.
Both the SRO fund and the insurance or bonding requirement offer
some advantages over the other proposed solutions. For instance, an
SRO fund would avoid the costs associated with relying on SIPC to
address the problem, such as the need to amend SIPA and potential
interference with SIPC's core mission of liquidating certain failed
broker-dealers and satisfying specified customer claims.81 Of course, an
SRO fund might itself need enabling authority and might likewise
interfere with the SRO's core mission of regulation and enforcement.
An NASD-administered fund is appealing because virtually all
broker-dealers are required to be members of NASD,82 and NASD
already supervises broker-dealers in so many different facets of their
behavior. 83 As NASD oversees the NASD-administered arbitration
84
forum, which is the principal forum for securities arbitration cases,
there is a natural fit for NASD to become guarantor of last resort in the
event duly-won arbitration awards are never paid. NASD already has
mechanisms in place for assessing broker-dealers, and therefore it would
have the levying apparatus necessary to generate the monies required for
an unpaid award fund. 85 NASD oversees many broker-dealer selfliquidations, giving it practical experience in dealing with the
circumstances that cause most unpaid awards.8 6
Finally, NASD
81. See generally infra Section D.3.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2005) (requiring every registered broker-dealer to be
a member of a registered national securities association unless it effects transaction solely
on a national securities exchange of which it is a member); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1
(2005) (exempting certain exchange members). NASD is the only registered national
securities association. Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealersfor Unsuitable
Recommendations to InstitutionalInvestors, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1493, 1495 n.3 (2001).
83. The NASD Conduct Rules exhaustively regulate broker-dealer behavior.
Ruder, supra note 3, at 1102 n.4. The rules can be accessed through NASD Manual
Online, http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2005).
84. See supra note 9.
85. See, e.g., Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg 71,256, 71,268-71,275 (Dec. 8, 2004) (discussing SRO
funding sources). The SEC noted that it had approved NASD's recent establishment of a
"Trading Activity Fee" because of "NASD's broad responsibilities with respect to its
members' activities." Id. at 71,269. Several years ago, NASD was financing its
arbitration system through "a combination of arbitrator related fees and general
assessments on all member firms." Ruder, supra note 3, at 1106.
86. SIPA contemplates SRO assistance in or oversight of broker-dealer self-
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ultimately might welcome an NASD-administered SRO-fund because
such a fund would make NASD as opposed to another organization the
guarantor of last resort where NASD-supervised arbitral procedures had
proven incapable of securing payment on an investor's vindicated
claims.87
Similarly, insurance and bonding deserve a closer look. Enough
time has passed, about five years, since NASD began to implement its
unpaid award reforms to warrant considering additional measures.8 8
While improved, the non-payment rate remains significant.89 The
absence of a systematic inquiry into the feasibility of insurance is not an
argument against its use but rather suggests the need for further
exploration.
A review of "excess" SIPC insurance is instructive because of its
similarities with coverage for unpaid awards. Such private insurance
satisfies customer claims that exceed the overall SIPC limits of
$500,000.90 Excess SIPC coverage resembles unpaid award insurance in
liquidations. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (2005). In 1987 and 1988, "while there were only
eight SIPC liquidations ... there were more than twice as many self-liquidations under
the auspices of the NASD Washington headquarters staff." During this period, there
were 18 such self-l iquidations with NASD overseeing the distribution of more than $250
million in customer property. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27249, 54
Fed. Reg. 40,395, at text following note 20 (Oct. 2, 1989). See Michael P. Jamroz, The
Customer Protection Rule, 57 Bus. LAW. 1069, at note 312 (2002) and accompanying
text [hereinafter Jamroz, Customer Protection Rule]. In its 1992 release amending the
Net Capital Rule, the SEC said NASD staff had advised it that even the smallest selfliquidation required two to three NASD employees on premises for a minimum of two
weeks, while, by contrast, a large liquidation had required approximately 25 NASD
employees on premises for almost ten weeks. Net Capital Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,973, at
*13 (Dec. 2, 1992).
87. On the other hand, NASD has argued that it does not bear responsibility for
unpaid awards as these primarily relate to collecting monies from brokers that have gone
out of business. Supra note 57. In addition, NASD might resist overseeing an unpaid
award fund for reasons that would include the heightened possibility of a moral hazardtype response to the protections it has already instituted with respect to securing
investors' awards (as outlined supra in Section B). In other words, investors might be
more inclined not to avail themselves of such protections knowing that ultimately they
need only apply to the NASD-administered fund for payment. Such a fund, then, should
only be available where the investor had explored all other potential remedies before
applying for reimbursement.
88. NASD began in 2000 to implement initiatives adverted to in its response to
GAO 2000. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. In GAO 2003, GAO said
SEC staff believed that expanding insurance and bonding requirements would not be
appropriate and that NASD's remedies "should be given time to work." GAO 2003,
supra note 1, at 11.
89. Supra Section A.
90. GAO SIPC UPDATE, supra note 39, at 1.
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that both concern customer accounts of broker-dealers that fail. A GAO
report noted that three out of the four major insurers offering excess
coverage in 2002 stopped underwriting these policies beyond 2003 for
reasons including low premium return and high potential risk. 91 On the
other hand, certain securities firms surveyed by GAO suggested that they
would want to continue to offer excess insurance to increase customer
confidence and compete for high net worth clients.92 Importantly, one of
the major insurers, Lloyd's of London, continued to provide such
insurance.93 Furthermore, in December 2003, a consortium of 14 NYSE
member firms organized and capitalized CAPCO, a New
York state
94
licensed insurance company, to provide excess coverage.
One can envision insurance for unpaid awards having a variety of
features that would make it more palatable to insurers than excess SIPC
coverage. Such features would include the creation of a claims history
(at the time of the GAO report, no one had put the excess coverage to
use) 95 given the recurrent nature of unpaid awards; a capped amount to
the awards (excess coverage having sought to protect against unlimited
loss);96 and a greater guaranteed market
for such insurance as broker97
it.
carry
to
required
be
would
dealers
With respect to bonding, NASD already requires that broker-dealers
maintain a "blanket fidelity bond." 98 This bond protects against losses
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 26-27.
93. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOLLOW-UP ON GAO RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, GAO-04-848R, at 8
(July 9, 2004), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04848r.pdf [hereinafter GAO
2004 FOLLOW-UP].

94. Id.
95. GAO SIPC UPDATE, supra note 39, at 24.
96. See id. According to the GAO report, the one major insurer that intended to
continue to provide excess coverage generally limited the amount of coverage per firm.
Id. at 26. In its 2004 follow-up, GAO noted (without specifying which) that one of the
insurers had capped both the amount of coverage per customer as well as its overall
exposure, while the other insurer did not set any specific dollar limits. GAO 2004
FOLLOW-UP, supra note 93, at 8.
97. A proponent of the insurance approach has claimed that it would be relatively
inexpensive to implement. Cane & Greenspon, supra note 4, at 140-41.
98. NASD Rule 3020 (2005), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/
display/index.html (follow "Conduct Rules" hyperlink). The rule applies to each NASD
member required to join SIPC who has employees and who is not a member in good
standing of a stock exchange such as the American Stock Exchange or New York Stock
Exchange. Rule 3020(c) (2005). The exchanges have similar rules. E.g., NYSE Rule
319 (2005), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERules/ (follow "Admission
of Members" hyperlink).
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caused by an officer or employee for actions such as fraudulent trading. 99
However, the bond is limited in its protection to the broker-dealer (as
opposed to a customer-claimant)'0 0 and the coverage amounts are in any
case potentially insufficient, especially for smaller brokers, to satisfy
unpaid awards.' 0' Nonetheless, the existence of the bond requirement,
pertaining to broker actions that also could give rise to customer claims
leading to unpaid awards, indicates that a similar bond could be required
that would directly cover such awards (much as excess0 2 SIPC coverage
points to the feasibility of insurance for unpaid awards).1
2. Enhancing the Net CapitalRule Would Reduce UnpaidAwards
Revising the Net Capital Rule is an attractive option for dealing
with unpaid awards because of the rule's close association with brokerdealer failure, the principal cause of unpaid awards. Furthermore, as this
99. NASD Rule 3020 requires that an NASD member maintain a bond providing
against loss and covering at least: "Fidelity," "On Premises," "In Transit,"
"Misplacement," "Forgery and Alteration," "Securities Loss," and "Fraudulent Trading."
NASD Rule 3020(a)(1) (2005). The bond is required to be in a form substantially similar
to the standard form of "Brokers Blanket Bond" promulgated by the Surety Association
of America. Id.
100. In other words, only the broker-dealer can file a claim for such damages. See
GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 43. In a bankruptcy, the bond would have a beneficial effect
(from the perspective of a customer claimant with an unpaid award) only in the sense of
increasing the size of the general estate (and thus, the ability of general creditors
including those with unpaid awards to satisfy their claims), rather than providing direct
compensation to the customer-claimant.
101. With respect to fraudulent trading, the rule imposes a minimum coverage
figure of not less than $25,000 or 50% of an amount determined with reference to the
broker-dealer's net capital requirement, up to $500,000, whichever is greater. NASD
Rule 3020(a)(4) (2005); see also GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 43 (noting inadequacy of
bond coverage amount). In 1998, NASD added section (c)(4) which allows for an
exemption from the requirement of section (c) that the coverage amount be determined
with reference to the broker-dealer's highest applicable net capital amount in the
immediately preceding 12-month period. NASD, SEC Approves Amendment To Rule
On Fidelity Bond Requirements, Notice to Members 98-67 (Aug. 1998), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_
004444 (follow "View Full Notice" hyperlink).
102. The blanket fidelity bond itself may be unsuitable as a candidate for covering
unpaid awards given its historical association with providing an employer with coverage
against the acts of its employees. To incorporate a payment procedure in which a
customer claimant could benefit directly from the bond might change the nature of the
bond so that it was no longer recognizable as a blanket fidelity bond, and might (a)
unduly complicate the operation of the bond (which may be intended, for instance, only
to operate with respect to an active firm); (b) have other undesired or unanticipated side
effects; and/or (c) meet with resistance from insurers who otherwise would routinely
supply such bonds.
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option would require a rule change rather than a new statute or even a
fund, it may prove easier to accomplish than some of the other proposals.
Altering the rule has been mentioned this year by a high-level regulator
03
as one of several possible solutions to the problem of unpaid awards.1
Two approaches that could be employed either separately or in
combination are: (a) making the rule tougher by requiring broker-dealers
to retain more capital; and (b) adding an escrow provision targeted at
unpaid arbitration awards.
A number of difficulties suggest themselves when considering the
Net Capital Rule as a means to combat unpaid awards. The rule is based
on a "liquidity" principle' °4 that may conflict with satisfying claims such
as those for unpaid awards that do not pertain to immediately available
cash or securities. The rule requires registered broker-dealers to
maintain specified minimum levels of capital, and therefore seeks 10to5
enable broker-dealers to liquidate in an orderly fashion if they fail.
This orderly liquidation is to be accomplished through the satisfaction of
a broker-dealer's "current indebtedness, particularly the claims of
customers. 10 6 Revising the rule to cover unpaid awards may well be
construed as going beyond the ambit of satisfying current liabilities, and
beyond the intended application of the liquidity principle. A revision
perceived to be at odds with the Net Capital Rule's traditional
underpinnings is likely to meet with resistance given the rule's longstanding nature (it was first formulated in 1942),107 its complexity,'0 8 and
103. Hearing, supra note 2 (testimony of Linda D. Fienberg) (stating that "NASD
is exploring additional measures to decrease the instances of unpaid awards such as
increases in net capital requirements," as well as "increased surveillance of marginally
capitalized firms with pending claims, and enhanced education for investors on how to
recognize the risks that a firm may go out of business."). Id. at 9.
104. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-l(c) ("The Net Capital
Rule, in short, is not a solvency rule but a liquidity rule.").
105. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31511, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,973,
56,974 (Nov. 24, 1992) (The rule "requires registered broker-dealers to maintain
sufficient liquid assets to enable those firms that fall below the minimum net capital
requirements to liquidate in an orderly fashion without the need for a formal
proceeding."); see also Michael P. Jamroz, The Net CapitalRule, 47 Bus. LAW 863 n.3
(1992) [hereinafter Jamroz, Net Capital Rule]; see generally Steven L. Molinari &
Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers' Financial Responsibility Under the Uniform Net
CapitalRule-A Casefor Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1 (1983).
106. Molinari & Kibler, supra note 105, at 18.
107. JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS
AND REGULATION UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAWS, § 4:2 (Release No. 4,
Nov. 2004) [hereinafter MARKHAM & HAZEN]; Joo, supra note 4, at 1100 n.153. See
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-1(c)(i).
108. NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION, § 18.02 [A][1]
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potentially settled expectations as to its current contours.
Other objections include the argument that establishing reserves
against unpaid awards would require a substantial increase in the rule's
minimum requirements, in particular because the reserves would need to
be large enough to cover all general creditor claims.10 9 Such a sizeable
increase "would force many small broker-dealers out of the industry, and
unduly penalize those broker-dealers operating in a responsible
manner."1 10 In addition, the cost of maintaining additional capital could
eventually be passed on to investors, at least in part, and the barrier to
entry posed by the increased capital requirement "could hurt investors by
limiting their choice of broker-dealers.""'
Furthermore, broker-dealers
are supposed to immediately book liabilities when they receive an
adverse award, and also must do so when they believe a claim is both
likely to succeed and the amount of the pending award is reasonably
certain. 112 Thus, broker-dealers are supposed to maintain sufficient
capital to cover the amount of an arbitration award.'" 3 Finally, an
objection to the escrow proposal would be that the Net Capital Rule is
based on accounting principles and is not equipped
to create reserves
14
against possible future adverse arbitration awards.
a. Making the Rule Tougher
The Net Capital Rule imposes minimum requirements that seem
surprisingly low."15 Indeed, these requirements were established well
(3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW] ("[T]he Rule is the longest and
probably the most complex in the entire SEC rulebook."). Id. at 18-4; MARKHAM &
HAzEN, supra note 107, § 4:1, 4-4 (The Rule is "so dense and so turgid that few persons,
other than specialized accountants and a few industry participants, can pierce its
complexities.").
109. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 42. The term "general creditor" refers to an
unsecured creditor who lacks rights against specific property of the debtor. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). General unsecured creditors are afforded a low priority
by the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2005); id. § 726(a).
110. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 42.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Other commentators have also noted the Net Capital Rule's potentially
inadequate requirements. Joo states that a broker-dealer may have complied with the rule
yet nonetheless its capital may prove to be inadequate when the broker-dealer becomes
insolvent. Joo, supra note 6, at 1102. Maintaining an adequate capital cushion may be
difficult given the volatile nature of the securities industry. See id. Cf John M.
Bellwoar, Note, Bar Baron at the Gate: An Argument for Expanding the Liability of
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over a decade ago (in 1992), and they permit a broker-dealer, depending
on the nature of its business, to retain anywhere from as little as $5000 to
$250,000.116 The low minimums suggest that the rule could be
strengthened in a way that would better accomplish its goal of ensuring
orderly liquidation while having the effect of leaving more money to pay
for claims including unpaid awards.
The rule requires every broker or dealer to have and maintain net
capital no less than the greater of the highest minimum applicable under
either "ratio requirements" or "minimum requirements."" 7 Under the
ratio requirements, a broker or dealer must meet either an "aggregate
indebtedness standard" or an "alternative standard." Net capital is
defined as a broker or dealer's "net worth," which is subject to various
potentially complex adjustments. 18
Under the aggregate indebtedness standard, a firm is required to
maintain net capital such that its aggregate indebtedness to all other
persons does not exceed 1500% of its net capital. " 9 Stated differently, a
firm must maintain net capital equal to 6 %% of its aggregate
indebtedness. Aggregate indebtedness is defined as "the total money
liabilities of a broker or dealer arising in connection with any transaction
whatsoever," subject to certain exclusions.12
Under the alternative
standard, a broker or dealer is required to maintain net capital that is not
less than the greater of $250,000 or 2% of "aggregate debit items.' 2'
Securities Clearing Brokers for the Fraud of Introducing Brokers, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev.

1014, 1033 (1999) (stating that the Net Capital Rule's $50,000 requirement for
introducing brokers pales in comparison with the "millions that introducing brokers can
obtain via fraud").
116. In certain instances, the Net Capital Rule may impose requirements higher
than $250,000. For instance, a "market maker," defined in part as a dealer who regularly
publishes bona fide competitive bid and offer quotations in a recognized interdealer
quotation system with respect to a particular security, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(8)
(2005), may be required to maintain minimum capital of up to $1 million. Id. §
240.15c3-1(a)(4).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a) (2005). In addition, a broker or dealer is required to
maintain net capital of not less than its own minimum net capital requirement plus the
sum of broker's or dealer's subsidiary or affiliate minimum net capital requirements. Id.
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (2005); POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra
note 108, § 18.02[A]. Adjustments relating to "the market value of securities and
commodities held in the broker-dealer's proprietary accounts" are known as "haircuts."
Id.
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(i) (2005).
120. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1). Money liabilities include, "among other things, money
borrowed, money payable against securities loaned," and customers' free credit balances.
Id.
121. Id. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii). The aggregate debit items are to be computed in
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The alternative standard is most commonly used by large broker-dealers
in part because it precludes a broker from employing the minimum
requirements where these requirements are less than $250,000.122
Under the minimum requirements, which serve as a minimum or
floor for the Net Capital Rule,12 3 a broker or dealer that carries customer,
broker, or dealer accounts and receives or holds funds or securities for
those persons (a "carrying" or "clearing" firm) is required to maintain net
capital of not less than $250,000.124 A $50,000 minimum applies to a
broker or dealer that (a) "introduces" customer transactions and accounts
to another broker-dealer that carries such accounts on a "fully-disclosed
basis," and that (b) receives but does not hold customer or other broker
or dealer securities. 125 However, a minimum of only $5000 applies
where the introducing firm does not receive or hold securities for
customers and does not carry accounts for customers.1 26 Other
requirements include that a "dealer" must maintain net capital of not less
than $100,000,127 while a broker or dealer that acts as a broker or dealer

accordance with a formula for the determination of reserve requirements for brokers and
dealers. Id. The "debit items in the... formula represent monies owed the broker-dealer
in relation to customer transactions." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-i.c(ii).
122. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 108, § 18.02[B][2][b].
123. Id.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(i) (2005). A broker or dealer that carries
customer accounts need only maintain net capital of not less than $100,000 if it meets the
following conditions: (i) does not carry margin accounts; (ii) promptly transmits all
customer funds; (iii) does not otherwise hold customers' funds or securities; (iv) does not
owe money or securities to customers; and (v) effectuates all financial transactions
through a specially designated bank account. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note
108, § 18.02[B][1]. Generally speaking, a "carrying" or "clearing" broker is one that
performs various services for an "introducing" broker, such as the maintenance of books
and records and the receipt, custody, and delivery of customer securities and funds, as
well as clearing transactions (e.g., paying for securities purchased). Henry F. Minnerop,
The Role and Regulation of Clearing Brokers, 48 Bus. LAW. 841 (1993).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(iv) (2005). An introducing broker is one that
retains all functions that relate to direct personal customer contacts, such as soliciting
customer accounts and making investment recommendations to customers, and accepting
their orders for the purchase or sale of securities. Minnerop, supra note 124, at 843. A
"fully-disclosed" clearing agreement is one in which the name of the clearing firm and of
the customer are disclosed to each other. Such an arrangement contrasts with the
"omnibus" agreement, in which neither the clearing firm nor the introducing firm's
customers are advised of each other's identities. Id.
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(vi) (2005).
127. Id. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(iii). A dealer is defined as a broker or dealer that
endorses or writes non-standardized options or that effects more than 10 transactions in
any one calendar year for its own investment account. See id.; POSER, BROKER-DEALER
LAW, supra note 108, § 18.02[B][l].
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with respect to the purchase, sale and redemption of "redeemable shares
of registered investment companies" must maintain net capital of not less
than $25,000.128

The SEC provided a rationale for these figures in its 1992 release
adopting the current minimum requirements (and raising them from
prior, lower levels).1 29 With respect to clearing firms, the Commission
said requiring additional capital would serve "as a fund from which the
expenses associated with liquidation can be paid," and that the "greater
sum will act as a more reliable cushion against the use of SIPC money to
liquidate a failed broker dealer.' 130 The Commission said that "[i]n most
instances, a $250,000 minimum net capital requirement should prove to
be a sufficient cushion for a reasonably conducted self-liquidation before
a broker-dealer's insolvency."' 3 1 Among the expenses the Commission
identified as arising during a self-liquidation were the salaries of a firm's
employees retained during the liquidation for purposes such as the
transfer of customer accounts, and the costs associated with transferring
securities and maintaining the premises of the firm. 132 The Commission
also noted that 109 out of 458 NASD firms that cleared customer
accounts or held customer property would need to raise an additional
$120,520 to comply with the $250,000 requirement. 133 Thus, the
Commission specifically contemplated that many firms would have to
raise money to meet the new requirement (albeit, as the Commission
pointed out, firms that represented only one percent of total clearing firm
revenues at about the time of the release). 34 The Commission provided
a somewhat similar rationale and analysis for the other minimum
requirements addressed in its release. 35 In other words, the 1992 release
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(v) (2005). A broker or dealer that acts as a
broker or dealer with respect to the purchase, sale and redemption of "interests or
participations in an insurance company separate account directly from or to the issuer on
other than subscription way basis" also falls within this category. Id.
129. Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31511, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,973
(Nov. 24, 1992).
Previously, for instance, clearing firms using the aggregate
indebtedness standard had been required only to maintain minimum capital of $25,000.
Id. at 56,975.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 56,975.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 56,976.
134. Id. The Commission suggested that those firms unable to meet the newly
raised clearing minimum could change the nature of their business by introducing their
customer accounts to another clearing firm. Id. at 56,977.
135. The Commission stated that for introducing firms, the increased minimums (of
$50,000 for an introducing firm that receives customer securities, and of $5000 for a firm
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makes clear that at least when it imposed the new requirements, the SEC
expected that the minimum figures would in fact be the operative net
capital levels for a significant fraction of broker firms. These smaller
firms to which the minimums would apply are likely to be those firms
that, because of their lesser capitalization, have a greater potential to
generate unpaid awards.
While the Net Capital Rule may impose surprisingly low minimum
requirements, there is also substantial opinion that the rule has worked
well to forestall broker-dealer bankruptcy under the expensive auspices
of SIPC.136 For example, in its most recent annual report, SIPC attributes

the scarcity of SIPC-overseen liquidations in that year (there were just
two in 2004) to the successful operation of the Net Capital Rule, as well
as the "Customer Protection Rule." 137 Indeed, there are several rules that
are intended to promote the "financial responsibility" of brokers.13 8 The
"Early Warning Rule"'139 provides, among other things, that a registered
broker or dealer must give notice to the SEC on the same day when its
net capital falls below the required minimum amount. 40 The Customer
that neither receives nor holds customer securities) would increase the likelihood that a
firm, if it were failing, could quickly find a purchaser for its assets and avoid an NASDsupervised self-liquidation. Id. at 56,979. It said that the heightened minimums also
would lessen the likelihood that an introducing firm failure would weaken a clearing
firm. Id. at 56,980. The Commission noted that, based on NASD data, 919 firms
accounting for 6.1% of total introducing firm revenues had net capital of less than
$50,000. Id.
136. See, e.g., Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39456, 62 Fed. Reg.
68,011, 68,012 (Dec. 30, 1997) ("The Commission believes the Rule has worked well
over the years. The Commission and the self-regulatory organizations... have generally
been able to identify at early stages broker-dealers that are experiencing financial
problems and to supervise self-liquidations of failing securities firms. This early
regulatory intervention has helped to avoid customer losses and the need for formal
proceedings under [SIPA]."); Jamroz, Net Capital Rule, supra note 105, at 864 ("By
setting the liquidation threshold at a level at which a broker-dealer will have adequate
liquid assets to satisfy customer claims, the Net Capital Rule, together with the other
financial responsibility rules, promotes orderly self-liquidations of financially distressed
broker-dealers and reduces the likelihood that the failed broker-dealer will have to be
liquidated pursuant to [SIPA].").
137. See SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005),
available at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/2004Annualreport.pdf [hereinafter SIPC 2004
ANNUAL REPORT]. The Customer Protection Rule is found at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3
(2005).
138. In addition to the "Customer Protection Rule" and the "Early Warning Rule"
(discussed immediately following) the financial responsibility rules include the
following: "Free Credit Balances," "Quarterly Box Counts," and "Hypothecation of
Customers' Securities." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-l(c).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-l1(2005).
140. Id. § 240.17a-1 l(b)(1). The Early Warning Rule imposes a variety of rapid
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Protection Rule, which requires broker-dealers to operate in a fashion
that provides strict safeguards for customer's securities and cash,' 41 has
been deemed especially important. 142 Of course, where there is fraud,
none of the financial responsibility rules is likely to prove very
effective. 143
Thus, it may be that despite its low minimums, the Net Capital Rule
operates successfully in at least two broad classes of cases. The first case
is where the ratio requirements have the effect of imposing substantial

notification requirements for net capital, recordkeeping, or reporting violations. Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-l.c.iii. For instance, notification to the SEC is required
within 24 hours where a broker-dealer subject to the aggregate indebtedness standard
makes a computation showing that its aggregate indebtedness is in excess of 1200% of its
net capital, or a broker or dealer which has elected the alternative standard makes a
computation showing that its net capital is less than 5% of aggregate debit items. 17
C.F.R. § 240.17a-11(b)(2)(c)(1-2) (2005). In addition, when a national securities
exchange or national securities association learns that a member broker or dealer has
failed to send a notice or transmit a report as required by the rule, it must give notice to
the SEC of this. Id. § 240.17a-1 1(f).
141. The rule requires, among things, that a broker or dealer promptly obtain and
thereafter maintain the physical possession or control of all fully-paid securities and
excess margin securities carried by a broker or dealer for the account of customers, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b) (2005), and that a broker or dealer maintain with a bank or banks
a "Special Reserve Bank Account" separate from any other bank account of the broker or
dealer. Id.
142. See, e.g., Jamroz, Customer Protection Rule, supra note 86, at 1070 ("The
Customer Protection Rule plays a primary role in the Commission's financial
responsibility program by safeguarding and restricting the use of customer investment
assets by the broker-dealer in its business activities.").
143. Fraudulent schemes leading to SIPC-administered broker-dealer liquidations
"have included not only the officials of carrying firms who illegally violated the customer
protection and net capital rules but also officials at introducing firms who stole customer
property that should have been sent to the carrying firms for the customers." U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
HAS MINIMIZED SIPC's LOSSES, GAO/GGD-92-109, at 29 (Sept. 1992), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/147624.pdf [hereinafter GAO 1992]. Cf DELOrrrE &
TOUCHE, STUDY OF THE FAILURE OF MJK CLEARING, THE SECURITIES LENDING BUSINESS
AND THE RELATED RAMIFICATIONS ON THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION

CORPORATION (May 2002) (considering the operation of financial responsibility rules

with respect to the collapse of MJK Clearing, discussed infra at notes 230, 253 and
accompanying text, and stating, at 22, that "any discussion of whether the financial
responsibility rules fell short necessarily presumes that the rules were complied with in
the first place"), available at http://www.sipc.org/media/statements-hill.cfm; FITCH RISK
MANAGEMENT, REVIEW OF SIPC RISK PROFILE AND PRACTICES: THE MJK CLEARING
EVENT, THE SECURITIES LENDING EXPOSURE, RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS § 5 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sipc.org
/media/statements-hill.cfm. While fraud may cause the rules to prove ineffective, the
existence of the rules make the commission of fraud more difficult.
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net capital requirements.1 44 The second case is where the rule operates in
conjunction with the other financial responsibility rules, but success 145
is
SIPC.
of
auspices
the
under
liquidation
of
defined as avoidance
However, in operating successfully in this latter regard, the rule may
nonetheless fail sufficiently to forestall or ameliorate liquidations that
prejudice customer claims including those for unpaid awards. This
seems likely given the longevity of the rule in its current form (or more
46
particularly, the longevity of the rule's current minimum impositions),
the rough "rule of thumb" aspect that underpins those minimum
requirements that have been mandated, 47 and the existence of sizeable
even years
numbers of unpaid awards (whether in 1998 or more recently)
148
after the rule with its current minimums had been adopted.
After all, the non-payment of arbitration awards can itself be taken
as a metric of the success or non-success of the broker self-liquidations
that occur, because it provides an indicator of the extent to which general
creditor claims against brokers have or have not been satisfied. Given
the necessary variability of the expenses associated with self-liquidation
(for instance, even in 1992, the SEC in its release neither identified nor
established the salary levels of employees intended to oversee a
144. The existence of such a case depends upon a number of assumptions: that the
rule in fact imposes substantial requirements, something difficult on its face to ascertain
given the rule's complexity; and that where the requirement is substantial, the capital
reserve either has an effect tending to forestall bankruptcy or else renders satisfaction of
current claims more complete than might otherwise have been expected.
145. See supra note 136 (authorities emphasizing how Net Capital Rule promotes

self-liquidation and avoids SIPC-administered liquidation).
146. It is worth noting that the SEC in 1992 increased the carrying broker minimum
ten-fold from its prior level of $25,000, which had been set in 1972, or 20 years
previously. See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27249, 54 Fed. Reg.
40,395, n.14 (Oct. 2, 1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Given that 13 years
have passed since the 1992 increase, a proportionate increase in the minimum (with the
13 years the numerator and 20 years the denominator of the fraction) would yield a more
than six-fold increase at this time, or a carrying broker minimum of $1.625 million. This
is not to suggest that $1.625 million is the appropriate figure for a potential revision, but
rather to give a sense that with the passage of a similar amount of time, a new, higher
minimum may well be appropriate.
147. The apparent care and sophistication with which certain aspects of the Net
Capital Rule have been considered or formulated provides a contrast with the arbitrary
quality of the rule's floor requirements. See, e.g., Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-39456, 62 Fed. Reg. 68,011 (Dec. 30, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240) (posing questions on extent to which statistical models should be used in setting
the capital requirements for a broker-dealer's proprietary positions); Molinari & Kibler,
supra note 105, at 22 ("[T]he levels of net liquid assets required under the net capital rule
appear arbitrary since there is no demonstrable statistical logic to the levels chosen.").
148. See generally supra Section A.
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particular broker's self-liquidation), 149 there must likewise be a
variability with respect to whether such a liquidation depletes only the
net capital extant, or also depletes some portion of the general estate as
well. In the latter case, the Net Capital Rule can be said to have failed in
its application, and by failing, to have prejudiced the claims of general
creditors including those with unpaid awards.
The potential meagerness of the minimum net capital requirements
indicates that these requirements could be raised without causing undue
hardship to broker-dealers (and suggest that the rule as a whole should be
revisited with respect to the adequacy of its strictures). 150 Requiring
firms to retain more minimum net capital would cause the rule to be
more successful with respect to ensuring adequate broker-dealer
liquidity. It might also have a number of beneficial side effects. By
leaving the broker-dealer with more capital in reserve, a toughened
minimum requirement might reduce in some degree the number or
amount of unsatisfied customer claims including those for unpaid
awards. 5 1 A toughened requirement would also ripple through to other
rules pegged to the Net Capital Rule causing, for instance, a stiffened
fidelity bond requirement, 152 and triggering the operation of the Early
149. The Commission, for that matter, also did not identify the costs to be expected
in maintaining the premises of the failing firm, or of transferring customer securities, and
furthermore stated that "[s]elf-liquidation costs incurred by the self-regulatory authorities
are difficult to measure." Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31511, 57
Fed. Reg. 56,973, 56,975 (Nov. 24, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). With
respect to the imposition of the $250,000 requirement for clearing or carrying brokers,
the Commission stated that it believed this requirement would function well "in most
instances," but, of course, not all. Id. at 56,975.
150. A significant portion of the Commission's analysis in its 1992 release pertains
to whether the new minimums would unduly burden smaller broker-dealers. In part, the
Commission concluded that where such brokers were unable to operate under the new
minimums, they could revise their form of business so that they would fall within a
category requiring a lower minimum. See, e.g., id. at 56,980. The Commission also
stated that the cost of the capital required to meet the higher minimums for introducing
brokers constituted "a slight insurance premium in light of the benefits that would be
derived from the increase." (emphasis supplied). Id. at 56,980.
151. In theory at least, heightened net capital requirements (whether with respect to
the minimum requirements or the rule as a whole) would also increase the number of
(cheaper) broker-dealer self-liquidations, and reduce the number of SIPC-administered
liquidations. This is important because, while SIPC-administered liquidations are
relatively infrequent, they are nonetheless comparatively expensive when they occur. See
infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. By further forestalling broker-dealer failure,
and by reducing the number of SIPC-administered liquidations, a stricter Net Capital
Rule would thus also result in fewer unpaid awards.
152. See supra note 101. The blanket fidelity bond amounts are calculated based
on the Net Capital Rule, and therefore a strengthened rule would, unless the calculations
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Warning Rule at an earlier stage.153
Of course, as a practical matter, determining the right amount of
extra capital to be required would be difficult given the uncertainties
involved in determining an adequate capital cushion. An increase in the
minimum capital standard that would reliably cover all unpaid arbitration
awards for a given broker-dealer is likely to be impracticable because
such an increase would have to provide as well for all other general
creditor claims, given that general creditor claims are satisfied on a
ratable basis. 54 An increase in the rule's requirements to the point where
it would have a substantial impact on unpaid awards would have to be
based upon a calculation estimating the number of awards likely to be
extant for a particular type of broker-dealer (with the less wellcapitalized brokers presumably having the highest number of such
potential claims outstanding).
Finally, the argument against a raised minimum capital requirement
that is based on broker-dealers booking liabilities when they receive an
adverse award or believe an arbitration claim is likely to succeed can be
addressed as follows. First, most unpaid awards are likely to arise
against a broker-dealer that is either in declining health or else has gone
out of business at the time an award is issued.155 Yet the booking of
liabilities is likely to be effective only in the limited class of claims
against broker-dealers that are financially healthy when the award is
made. Second, broker-dealers may well be disinclined to assess a claim
against them as likely to succeed, and therefore the increase in capital for
such an eventuality would operate effectively only (a) in what would
again be a limited number of cases where a prospective adverse outcome
(for the broker-dealer) is too obvious to be denied and (b) again, where
the broker-dealer is in sufficient financial health when judgment for the
were revised, result in higher amounts being required. See, e.g., NASD Rule 3020(a)(3)
(2005) (setting broker-dealer's required minimum coverage for "Fidelity," etc., at not less
than 120% of its required net capital under the Net Capital Rule).
153. See supra note 140. Because notice to the SEC of a broker's financial
difficulties is triggered by a deficiency with respect to the broker's net capital, such
notice would have to be made sooner where the deficiency had arisen sooner because the
required net capital had been higher.
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2005) (providing for pro rata payment of claims
within classes of claim in Chapter 7 liquidations); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)
("creditors of equal priority should receive pro rata shares of the debtor's property.");
Alec P. Ostrow, The Animal FarmofAdministrative Insolvency, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 339, 341 (2003). SIPA incorporates § 726(b) through 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (2005).
Unpaid arbitration awards would qualify as general creditor claims. See infra note 188.
155. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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claim is rendered.
b. Requiring Escrow for Unpaid Awards
Under this approach, the Net Capital Rule would be revised to
require additional broker-dealer capital to be set aside for a period in
escrow.1 56 This revision would ensure that the additional capital would
be available157
to pay for awards in the event that a broker-dealer goes out
of business.

The escrow approach would be "cheaper" to accomplish than a
toughening of the net capital requirements that had an appreciable impact
on the number and quantity of unpaid awards. The amount of escrow
would be targeted to include unpaid awards but no more, and as such,
would presumably require reserving far less capital (assuming, of course,
that the quantum of unpaid awards is significantly less than the sum of
all general creditor claims other than unpaid awards).
However, an escrow-based revision would have to surmount
concerns as to why the rule had been changed to elevate a particular class
of general creditor claims above others. Why not include escrow for any
number of the rest? A broad answer is that a particularly compelling
rationale for favoring unpaid awards is the same rationale as underpins
the Net Capital Rule: namely, the preservation of confidence in the
capital markets. 158 Just as inadequate liquidity has led to disorderly
broker-dealer liquidation, 159 so too does a failure to pay investors their
156. A two-year period was suggested in the GAO report describing proposed
solutions to unpaid awards. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 41-42.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570 (1979) (The Net
Capital Rule is "the principal regulatory tool by which the Commission and the Exchange
monitor the financial health of brokerage firms and protect customers from the risks
involved in leaving their cash and securities with broker-dealers." (footnote omitted));
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 107, § 4:1 ("The effect of the net capital rule goes
beyond the question of broker-dealer solvency as it also is designed to increase investor
confidence."). Markham and Hazen quote from Guy D. Marranette, 11 S.E.C. 967, 97071 (1942) for the proposition that: "[c]ustomers do not open accounts with a broker
relying on suit, judgment and execution to collect their claims-they are opened in the
belief that a customer can, on reasonable demand, liquidate his cash or securities
position." MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 107, § 4:1. Conversely, an investor who has
proceeded through "suit, judgment," yet finds "execution" stymied for reasons beyond
his or her reasonable control will no doubt prove less willing to invest in the future, and
where such "execution" is stymied for a sizeable group, a deleterious impact on investor
confidence in the aggregate may ensue.
159. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 107, § 4:1 ("[T]he net capital requirements
for broker-dealers were an effective response to justifiable alarm over many spectacular

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/8

34

2005]

UNPAID ARBITRA TION A WARDS

adjudicated awards undermine general confidence in entrusting brokerdealers with capital. In the latter case, of course, the threat to investor
confidence is diffuse rather than dramatic, and corrosive rather than
immediate in its impact. But this investor-confidence rationale serves to
elevate unpaid awards above run-of-the-mill general creditor claims, and
would help to justify the segregation of such awards within the confines
of the rule on the principles that already animate the rule.
Arriving at an appropriate escrow size would pose technical
challenges and require trade-offs. A per-broker flat rate amount might be
both under- and over-inclusive, in the sense of requiring too little or too
much of the smaller brokers, and vice versa for the larger brokers.
Similarly, a sliding scale based on criteria such as revenues or accounts
served might have the effect of saddling the larger brokers who pay their
awards anyway with an excessive capital requirement. An escrow
amount calculated on risk might better capture unpaid awards yet have a
negative effect on the ability of smaller brokers to function. Finally,
appropriately-sized escrow requirements that were embedded in the Net
Capital Rule might present a lopsided quality, unless the net capital
minimum requirements were also raised. In other words, if the
minimums were left intact, a given broker might have an escrow
requirement of $500,000 with respect to unpaid awards, yet retain
minimum net capital of just $5000 or $50,000.
Nonetheless, as a collective matter, these obstacles appear to be
surmountable. For instance, the sliding scale amount could be adjusted
not only in terms of a broker's size but also its risk of generating unpaid
awards; a pure risk metric might be justifiable precisely because of
smaller brokers' lesser ability to function, just as riskier drivers pay
higher insurance premiums, without necessarily having regard to the
proportionate economic hardship that the riskier drivers suffer because of
these greater premiums.
c. Historical Justification
Revising the Net Capital Rule to target unpaid awards, whether
through a general toughening of the rule or through an escrow
requirement, would find further grounding if such a revision were made
as part of an expansion of SIPC's responsibilities, which is discussed in
Section D.3 below. In particular, if SIPC were chosen as the appropriate
entity for reducing unpaid awards, it would be logical to consider
firm failures.").
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changing the Net Capital Rule to reinforce SIPC's added mission. This
is because the Net Capital Rule and SIPC share a close historical tie, and
the rule and SIPC operate in relation to each other.
The enactment of SIPA in 1970 (creating SIPC) also included an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934160 that directed the
SEC to establish rules with respect to the financial responsibility of
brokers.16 1 In response, the Commission made changes to its net capital
rule (and also adopted the Customer Protection Rule).162 The changes to
the Commission's net capital rule (at the time, the New York Stock
Exchange also had a net capital rule) 63 included an increase in the
minimum net capital requirement and a limit on the ratio of permissible
broker-dealer aggregate indebtedness.1 64 Later, in 1975, in a further
response to the crisis that had given rise to SIPA (the "back office" or
"paperwork" crisis, discussed more fully in Section D.3 below),
Congress amended the Exchange Act by directing the Commission to
"establish minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers
and dealers."' 65 The Commission in turn adopted the "uniform net
capital rule" (or, as used herein, the Net Capital Rule) which (allowing
for subsequent amendments) is the rule in its current form. 66 SIPC and
the Net Capital Rule operate in tandem in the sense that the rule is
designed to reduce the likelihood of a SIPC-administered liquidation,
given that broker-dealer self-liquidation is less costly than SIPC
167
liquidation.

Given this historical nexus and interlinked operation, it follows that
if one were to alter SIPC to incorporate unpaid awards, one might also
revise the Net Capital Rule to further effectuate the purposes of this
alteration. While the converse to this proposition is true as well (i.e., that
if one decided to change the Net Capital Rule, one should consider
revising SIPA, too), an expansion of SIPC's responsibilities is the more
likely solution to unpaid awards given the compelling reasons discussed
in Section D.3 below. But the cost of this expansion could be
ameliorated in some degree by corresponding changes to the Net Capital
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2005).
161. Id. § 78o(c)(3); Molinari & Kibler, supra note 105, at 10.
162. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 107, § 4:2.
163. See Nicholas Wolfson & Egon Guttman, The Net Capital Rules for Brokers
and Dealers,24 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1972).
164. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 107,

§ 4:2.

165. Id.
166. See id.
167. Jamroz, Net CapitalRule, supra note 105, at 864.
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Rule. A willingness to revise the rule would then expand the options for
appropriately balancing the costs of addressing the problem of unpaid
awards where this solution relied on SIPC in the first instance. It is
possible that the manner in which the costs were imposed might be made
even more rational than with a "standalone" solution.
3. ExpandingSIPC Coverage Is Feasible and Sensible
Of the potential solutions to the problem of unpaid arbitration
awards, expanding coverage by SIPC to include unpaid arbitration
awards may offer the most advantages. SIPC compensates investors for
certain specified claims when a broker-dealer fails, just as it would if
charged with handling unpaid awards. And SIPC, which has been in
existence for 35 years, and has handled several hundred broker-dealer
has an
liquidations and hundreds of thousands of customer accounts,
68
awards.
unpaid
reducing
with
closely
fit
would
that
expertise
In addition, SIPC already has an underutilized fund of more than $1
billion that could be immediately applied to pay off unpaid awards (and
SIPC itself has been arguably underutilized in recent years). 169 This
fund, from whose interest SIPC easily finances its operations, has been
maintained for almost a decade at a cost to each of SIPC's broker-dealer
members of just $150 a year, the statutory minimum. 70 The flat rate of
just $150 has been applied to each of SIPC's members irrespective of
whether they are Wall Street giants or Main Street brokers. 7 ' Thus,
increasing SIPC's annual financial burden by the approximately $30
million of unpaid awards (at the recent, provisional 2004 run rate) is
unlikely to risk exhausting the SIPC fund.
a. SIPA/SIPC Background
Congress enacted SIPA 172 (the statute) and created SIPC 73 (the
organization) following a rash of broker-dealer failures beginning in the
late 1960s known as the "back office' 174 or "paperwork"'175 crisis. In
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See infra notes 223, 229-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
Id.
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2005).
Id. § 78ccc(a)(1).
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-5(a); Joo, supra note 4, at 1076.
E.g., Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
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Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,"7 6 the Supreme Court

described SIPA's genesis as follows:
Following a period of great expansion in the 1960s, the securities industry
experienced a business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a
significant number of brokerage firms. Customers of failed firms found
their cash and securities on deposit either dissipated or tied up in lengthy
bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to its disastrous effects on customer
assets and investor confidence, this situation also threatened a 'domino
effect' involving otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open
transactions with firms that failed. Congress enacted the SIPA to arrest
this process, restore investor confidence in the capital markets, and
upgrade the financial responsibility requirementsfor registered brokers
and dealers.

One commentator
has argued that much of the crisis stemmed from
7

outright fraud.

1

79
SIPA operates as a statutory carve-out from the Bankruptcy Code.1
The statute addresses a particular class of claims, those for securities and
cash held in a customer's account at the time a broker-dealer fails. These
claims are called "customer"' 80 claims for "net equity."' 8 ' SIPA protects
these claims in amounts of up to $500,000. 182 Of this amount, up to
83
$100,000 may be paid for cash deposited for the purpose of trading.

1978); Molinari & Kibler, supra note 105, at 12.
176. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
177. Id. at 415 (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). SIPC describes its roots as
follows: "(SIPC) had its origins in the difficult years of 1968-1970, when the paperwork
crunch, brought on by unexpectedly high trading volume, was followed by a very severe
decline in stock prices. Hundreds of broker-dealers were merged, acquired or simply
went out of business. Some were unable to meet their obligations to customers and went
bankrupt. Public confidence in our securities markets was in jeopardy." SIPC 2004
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 4.
178. Joo, supra note 4, at 1084.
179. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
180. SIPA defines "customer" as "any person.., who has a claim on account of
securities received, acquired, or held by the [failed broker-dealer being liquidated by
SIPC] in the ordinary course of its business as a broker or dealer from or for the securities
accounts of such person for safekeeping, with a view to sale, to cover consummated
sales, pursuant to purchases, as collateral security, or for the purposes of effecting
transfer." 15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (2005).
181. SIPA defines "net equity" as "the dollar amount of the account or accounts of
a customer." Id. § 78111(11). This dollar amount is to be determined at the time of the
debtor's liquidation, minus any debt of the customer to the failed broker-dealer, plus any
payment by the customer towards such debt. See id.
182. Id. § 78fff-3(a).
183. Id. § 78fff-3(a)(1).
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SIPC will seek to satisfy such claims in the first instance out of the
bankrupt broker-dealer's estate. 84 If this is not possible, it will advance
the monies to pay for the claims itself.185 SIPC will not protect claims
such as those arising out of fraud or a decline in the market value of
securities, 186 nor will it cover unpaid arbitration awards. 1 87 Investors
with such claims must 88satisfy them from the general estate along with
other general creditors. 1
By protecting investor claims related to securities and cash held at
the time of a broker-dealer's failure, SIPA is intended to "boost investor
confidence in each broker-dealer firm and in the broker-dealer industry
as a whole."' 189 As the Barbour court suggested, SIPA is also intended to
protect against a "domino effect," in which one firm's failure leads to the
failure of other broker-dealers. 190 Such an effect could arise either out of
investor panic or incomplete transactions between a failed broker-dealer
and other firms. 191 SIPA's emphasis on returning securities to an
investor indicates that the statute is intended to keep investment capital
in the securities markets. 92 Satisfaction of SIPC-protected claims can be
swift. According to SIPC, "most193customers can expect to receive their
property in one to three months."'

184. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(1)(B) (2005) provides that the trustee in a SIPCsupervised liquidation shall allocate "customer property" to "customers of [the failed
broker-dealer], who shall share ratably in such customer property on the basis and to the
extent of their respective net equities." SIPA defines customer property as "cash and
securities... at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account of a debtor
from or for the securities accounts of a customer." Id. § 78111(4); see Stephen P. Harbeck,
Stockbroker Bankruptcy: The Role of the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court Under
the Securities Investor Protection Act, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 277, 279 (1982) ("[SIPA]
contemplates that customers' claims will be satisfied to the maximum extent possible
from the assets of the defunct member firm.").
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2005).
186. Securities Investor Protection Corp., Answers to the 7 Most Asked Questions,
http://www.sipc.org/who/sipc3question.cfm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
187. See Joo, supra note 4, at 1096 n.135.
188. Id. at 1097.
189. Id. at 1106. But see SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.
1974) ("[T]he objective of SIPA was to protect members of the investing public, not
brokers.").
190. See Secs. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975); Joo,
supra note 4, at 1114-17.
191. Joo, supra note 4, at 1110-11.
192. Id. at 1112-13.
193. Securities Investor Protection Corp., Answers to the 7 Most Asked Questions,
http://www.sipc.org/who/sipc3question.cfm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). But see Joo,
supra note 4, at 1113 (stating that accounts are often frozen for months); infra note 214
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b. Critiques of Expanding SIPC
Critics have charged that expanded SIPC coverage for unpaid
awards would change SIPC's mission of ensuring orderly liquidation of a
failed broker-dealer. 194 They have also argued that such an expansion
would require amending SIPA, would increase SIPC's caseload, and
would require SIPC to grow. 95
The critics further argue that coverage of unpaid awards would
increase the costs of both broker-dealers and investors, and might
encourage frivolous claims and reduce investors' incentives to carefully
choose their brokers and investments.1 96 Using SIPC money would
quickly exhaust the SIPC Fund. 197 The necessity of then replenishing
SIPC's coffers would burden those few well-capitalized brokers that
have largely paid 98for SIPC and which are not delinquent in paying
1
arbitration claims.

c. Why Expanding SIPC Works
However, despite these criticisms, SIPC remains an attractive
vehicle for dealing with the problem of unpaid awards. Opposition to a
SIPC solution based solely on generalized claims of excess costs is
predicated on an unfair shifting of burdens more appropriately borne by
those other than the few unlucky investors saddled with unpaid awards.
Likewise, "moral hazard" type critiques are inappropriate in a context
such as this where individual scrutiny is unlikely to be inappropriately
changed (or even changed), and where heightened scrutiny that would
evade the loss for which relief is sought is unlikely to be possible in any
case. More specifically, expanded SIPC coverage is an inviting option
for the reasons enumerated below.
First, SIPA's purpose is broadly similar to the purpose that would
animate an attempt to reduce the number and amount of unpaid awards.
In both cases, there is or would be a desire to return to investors the
assets they would otherwise lose because of a broker-dealer's failure, so
that other investors are willing to continue to commit their own assets to
(noting that individual account transfer process, where necessary, can slow down
satisfaction of customer claims).
194. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 40.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 40-41.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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the capital markets.
Of course, distinctions exist between SIPA and seeking to remedy
unpaid awards. SIPA arose out of a financial crisis involving a wave of
broker-dealer failures, while the problem of unpaid awards presents no
such dramatic crisis and, indeed, the problem has been somewhat
reduced in recent years. Also, SIPA is very specific in defining those
investor assets it seeks to protect: identifiable cash and securities, up to
the specified limits, that were or should have been held in a customer's
account at the time the broker-dealer went out of business. By contrast,
arbitration awards are neither cash nor securities, but a claim
(presumably) for cash arising out of a broker-dealer's acts prior to its
failure. Indeed, SIPA excludes other investor claims including claims
such as unpaid awards. 99 Moreover, court interpretations of SIPA, as
well as SIPC's own materials, explicitly reject the notion that SIPC
should cover claims for fraud. 200 Thus, to fit comfortably within the
scheme of protection envisioned by SIPA, unpaid awards need to bear
more in common with cash or securities than with claims for fraud. They
do in that they are "adjudicated" claims against a broker-dealer, most
likely with a monetary judgment attached, and thus come closer to cash
or securities than they do to unresolved claims of wrongdoing against the
broker-dealer.
In any case, unpaid awards need not be identical to cash and
securities held in a customer's account for unpaid awards to merit
inclusion within an amended SIPA. Rather, the question is whether an
amended SIPA, amended for reasons additional and related to the policy
reasons that animated SIPA's creation, would make sense as the statutory
vehicle for reducing the number and amount of such awards. Here,
elements of the legislative history and subsequent court interpretations of
SIPA are helpful.
For instance, the House Report that accompanied the enactment of

199. Supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
200. E.g., Miller v. DeQuine Revocable Trust, Nos. 01-CV-2812/2813, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20459, at *15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Oberweis Secs. Inc., 135 B.R.
842, 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) ("[C]Iaims based on fraud or breach of contract are not
considered part of a customer's protected net equity claim."); Secs. Investor Prot. Corp.
v. Executive Secs. Corp., No. 75 Civ. 733, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11326, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("SIPA was not enacted to guarantee customers investments in the event
of a broker-dealer fraud."); Secs. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Charisma Sec. Corp., 371 F.
Supp. 894, 899 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 506 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1974); Securities Investor
Protection Corp., Why We are NOT the FDIC,http://www.sipc.org/who/notfdic.cfm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Why We are NOT the FDIC] .
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SIPA in 1970 noted that broker-dealer failures stemming from the back
office crisis "may lead to loss of customer's funds and securities with an
inevitable weakening of confidence in the U.S. securities markets [and]
[s]uch lessened confidence has an effect on the entire economy." 20 1 Of
course, while this language referred to a rash of failures, it offers support
for the notion that claims such as unpaid awards, which arise out of a
loss of customer funds, may also contribute to a weakening of market
confidence. As mentioned, the Barbour court stated that SIPA was
20 2
intended to "restore investor confidence in the capital markets.,
Moreover, the Court also noted that when customers find "their cash and
securities on deposit either dissipated or tied up," the effect is
"disastrous... on customer assets and investor confidence., 20 3 Inother
cases, the courts have emphasized SIPA's goal of accomplishing a return
of investors' assets.20 4 Thus, SIPA's legislative history and court
interpretations can be read in a way that supports the notion that
including unpaid awards does not so much change SIPC's mission as
broaden it to a related area. This broadening would further SIPC's
overall goal of maintaining investor confidence in the securities markets.
Amending SIPA to include unpaid awards is further justified
because SIPA did more than create SIPC; it also, as noted previously,
directed the SEC to enhance the "financial responsibility" of brokerdealers. 20 5 Adding unpaid awards, which arise within the context of
broker-dealer irresponsibility and failure, to SIPC's responsibilities thus
fits within SIPA's broader purpose.
Resistance to the unpaid award reform proposal based on the
argument that SIPC was never intended to operate like the FDIC is

201. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1613, at 5255 (1970); see also id. at 5257 (stating that one of

SIPA's "two aims" was to establish a reserve fund whose effect would be to "reinforce

the confidence that investors have in the U.S. securities markets"; the other aim was to
strengthen "the financial responsibilities of broker-dealers.").
202. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., In re Gov't Sec. Corp., 972 F.2d 328, 331 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The
purpose of SIPA is to return to customers of brokerage firms their property or money...
Congress wanted more, not fewer assets available for customers of brokerage firms in
financial distress."); SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1974)
("SIPA thus looks to requiting investor-customers of the defunct house ....); SEC v.
Goren, 206 F. Supp. 2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that "Congress ultimately
created SIPA to protect small investors from failing broker-dealers that oftentimes
misappropriate customer funds in their final operational days." (citation omitted)).
205. The SEC responded by developing the uniform Net Capital Rule and the
Customer Protection Rule. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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inapposite. SIPC distinguishes itself from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, which insures deposits in banks and thrift institutions for up
to $100,000.206 SIPC states that "insurance" for investment fraud does
not exist in the United States, and that SIPC, "could not keep its doors
open for long if its purpose was to compensate all victims in the event of
loss due to investment fraud., 20 7 Again, however, unpaid awards are not
the same thing as claims for fraud for which no judgment has been
rendered; in the former case, investors, having reposed their trust in a
regulator-sanctioned arbitration system, have pursued remedies for their
losses to the point where their claims have been adjudicated and
vindicated.
Moreover, adding unpaid awards to SIPC's responsibilities does not
amount to refashioning SIPC into the FDIC. SIPC operates on a much
smaller scale than the FDIC, and this scale would not be appreciably
208
altered by SIPC's assumption of responsibility for unpaid awards.
Also, remedying unpaid awards pertains to customers, just like SIPC's
protections (although, as discussed below, SIPC also ultimately bolsters
the broker-dealer industry as a whole). By contrast, the FDIC, while
insuring bank deposits, also seeks explicitly to return failing banks to
health (while SIPC simply liquidates broker-dealers). 9
Second, SIPC's enabling statute, SIPA, creates a preferential carveout from the Bankruptcy Code for a particular class of investor claim
arising out of the failure of a broker-dealer. The purpose of this carveout is to maintain investor confidence. Moreover, SIPC itself serves as a
vehicle for securing these claims. Thus, SIPA and SIPC are logical
starting points for providing preferential treatment to a similar class of
claims such as those for unpaid awards, which likewise stem from a
broker's failure and whose existence otherwise might put investor
confidence at risk.
Through SIPA, Congress has created a framework of liquidation

206. Why We are NOT the FDIC,supra note 200 ("SIPC is not the securities world
equivalent of FDIC-the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."); 12 U.S.C. § 1821
(a)(l)(A)-(B) (2005).
207. See Why We are NOT the FDIC, supra note 200.
208. SIPC has a staff of about 30. Infra note 227 and accompanying text. By
contrast, the FDIC has a staff of about 5,200, insures more than $3 trillion of deposits in
U.S. Banks and thrifts, and directly examines and supervises about 5,300 banks and
savings banks. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Who is the FDIC, http://www.fdic.
gov/about/leam/symbol/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
209. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (2005) (empowering FDIC to assist troubled
insured banks); see also Joo, supra note 4, at 1105-06.
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distinct in certain particulars from that of the Bankruptcy Code. 10° This
framework elevates the claims of investors for their immediately
available cash and securities over other claims on the estate of the
defunct broker-dealer. In Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,211
Judge Milton Pollack wrote, "[t]he basic scheme of SIPA is to create a
preferred class of creditors.,2 12 SIPA accomplishes this goal by giving
SIPC the ability to satisfy customers' claims to the securities or cash that
were supposed to have been immediately available, up to the specified
limits. 2 13 SIPA enables SIPC in some cases to satisfy these claims
quickly.21 4 As mentioned, the potentially swift, compensatory power is
intended to serve the goal of maintaining investor confidence, preventing
a "domino" effect of failed broker-dealers, and also protecting investors

210. The distinctiveness is reinforced in that the Bankruptcy Code retains sections
governing the liquidation of stockbrokers. See 1 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (2005); Joo, supra
note 4, at 1104. A SIPC-administered liquidation proceeds as follows: When SIPC
determines that one of its (broker-dealer) members has failed or is in danger of failing, it
applies to the appropriate United States district court for a "protective decree." If and
when such a decree is either consented to (by the member) or granted (by the court), the
proceeding is removed to a bankruptcy court, with a trustee having been specified by
SIPC and appointed by the district court. SIPA provides for various procedures that are
tailored to the unique nature of the securities industry and designed to shorten the length
of time necessary to satisfy claims. See Harbeck, supra note 184, at 281-85. However,
in general, the liquidation proceeding will follow the dictates of the Bankruptcy Code.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (2005); Harbeck, supra note 184, at 285.
211. Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 744 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
212. Id. at 555 (emphasis supplied). To a certain extent, this preference preexisted
SIPA. Section 60(e) of the Bankruptcy Act (enacted in 1938) allowed "cash customers"
to reclaim cash or securities that could be specifically identified as their property.
Moreover, cash or securities held for the account of customers but not identifiable, were
to constitute a separate fund to be appliedpro rata in satisfaction of customers' claims in
priority to the claims of general creditors. Harbeck, supra note 184, at 278. SIPA
enhanced the preferential treatment of such customers by providing for SIPC monies to
augment the fund of customer property in which customers share to the exclusion of
general creditors. Id. at 279-80. As Judge Pollack noted, SIPA's "roots are in section
60(e) of the old Bankruptcy Act" (citation omitted). Mishkin, 744 F. Supp. at 557.
213. Mishkin, 744 F. Supp. at 556 ("The ability quickly to pay off net equity claims
of customers is the most important feature of SIPA.").
214. SIPC's ability to make quick transfers of a customer's accounts depends on a
variety of factors, including whether the trustee acting on behalf of SIPC is able to make
"bulk" transfers of customers' accounts from a given broker-dealer, either to the
customers themselves or other broker-dealers. GAO 1992, supra note 143, at 32.
However, where individual-by-individual account assessment becomes necessary, the
process is significantly lengthened. Id. ("Payment of claims account by account can take
months."). Because of the prevalence of fraud as an underlying cause of many SIPCsupervised liquidations, the proportion of bulk transfers is comparatively low. Id. at 3334.
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from losses because of the failure of the broker-dealers.1 5 Treating
investors with unpaid awards as members of a similarly preferred class
would fit readily within SIPA's framework, especially as such investors
were likewise victimized by the broker-dealer's collapse and especially
as subsequent investors would take comfort from the protection afforded
the prior investors.
An argument against expanding SIPC's role would be that the
preferential treatment it provides is justified only because of the systemic
risk SIPA seeks to alleviate. After all, since the back office crisis of the
late 1960s gave rise to SIPA, only a crisis of similar proportions would
justify the inclusion of an additional class of claims within the statutory
framework, and no such crisis is extant.
However, from the perspective of today, it is difficult to determine
whether the systemic risk that gave rise to SIPA persists. It may be that
under current conditions, 35 years after the enactment of the statute, the
risk is much less than it was. Presumably many of the technical
deficiencies and even regulatory gaps that gave rise to the back office
crisis have been cured, even apart from the functioning of

SIPC. 2 16

If so,

there is less reason for focusing on the failure of marginal broker-dealers
while ignoring the harm done by an imperfect arbitration payment
system. Even if the systemic risk remains considerable, that in itself
does not exclude amending the statute in order to enhance the protection
of other investors who are injured because of broker-dealer failure. The
rationales for doing so would include a more generalized desire to
alleviate systemic risk by boosting investor confidence and a wish to
vindicate the rights of individual investors for reasons of equity.
There does not seem to be much of a principled reason why
securities or cash held in account at the time of broker-dealer failure
should be given greater protection than claims which have already been
adjudicated through the arbitration system. If anything, one could as
readily argue that carefully adjudicated claims should be more deserving
because of the regulator-sanctioned nature of the attention that they have
received. The current statutory scheme reflects a potentially debatable
policy choice that it is more important to guard against short-term shocks
215. See supra notes 189-92; see also Mishkin, 744 F. Supp. at 555 ("In addition to

the congressional report, the remarks of the individual senators and representatives show
that the intent of the statute was to protect individual investors from losing their
investments when broker-dealers failed.").
216. For instance, the back office crisis in part stemmed from technical
backwardness in trade processing, which was subsequently corrected by the
establishment of depositaries for securities certificates. Joo, supra note 4, at 1083.
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than ensuring that the system of investor justice functions as investors
would expect. Perhaps the calculus leading to this choice would change
if the plight of the unlucky investors with unpaid awards were to become
more widely known. At a minimum, such unfortunate investors deserve
treatment equal to the unfortunate investors whose cash and/or securities
went missing at the time of broker-dealer failure.
In relying on SIPA's "precedent" of elevating a certain class of
customer claims over general creditor claims as a justification for
similarly elevating unpaid awards, a note of caution is in order. This is
the potential unfairness that permeates the SIPA scheme: specifically,
that the liquidation approach requires the often high administrative
expenses of a liquidation to be paid in the first instance from the general
estate, 217 potentially exhausting the estate in the process, and therefore in
many cases extinguishing deserving general creditor claims. 21 8 For such
unpaid awards as would have fallen under the liquidating authority of
SIPC, it would seem to compound this unfairness if one were simply to
append the unpaid awards to the preference received by cash and
securities on hand.2 19 Rather, it would be better to take the SIPA
precedent as reason to treat the unpaid awards as special, but not in a
fashion that is at the expense of other general creditors.
Third, SIPC is a pre-existing organization that is well-versed in
dealing with defunct broker-dealers. Augmenting SIPC's duties with
unpaid awards would not require a new law, but rather amendments to an
existing one. There would be no need for a new bureaucracy, but rather
additional responsibilities for an organization that possesses the requisite
expertise. Limited statutory amendments and added responsibilities are
likely to be easier to justify and accomplish than a new law and a new
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(e) (2005) (administration and liquidation costs and
expenses to be borne by the general estate); see also id. § 78eee(b)(5)(E) (providing that
"allowances," compensation for costs and expenses incurred during liquidation
proceeding, shall be charged against the general estate of the failed broker-dealer, and
that SIPC shall advance funds for.such allowances only if the general estate is insufficient
to pay for the allowances in whole or in part).
218. Joo, supra note 4, at II.B.2; see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P. 752.02[l]
(15 ed. rev. 2005) at n.1 (noting that SIPC benefits because SIPA "permits the general
estate to be exhausted by administrative expenses that would otherwise be borne by
SIPC"). Joo notes that from 1970 to 1996, the general estates of SIPA debtors paid for
over $171 million in administrative expenses, yet during the same period, distributions
from the SIPC Fund for customer claims amounted to only $174 million. Joo, supra note
4, at 1117.
219. Given that few of the broker-dealers that go out of business do so under the
auspices of SIPC, see infra note 222, the number of such awards may likewise be
relatively few.
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entity.
SIPC is well-positioned to handle unpaid awards. Almost all
broker-dealers are already members of SIPC, giving both SIPC and the
broker-dealer industry broad familiarity with each other.22 ° Indeed, three
out of SIPC's seven board members are required under SIPA to be
representatives of the securities industry. 221 Although SIPC-administered
liquidations are rare in comparison with the number of broker-dealers
leaving the industry, 222 SIPC has handled many broker-dealer
liquidations during its existence, and continues to handle such
liquidations each year.2 23 Moreover, those SIPC liquidations that do
arise frequently involve allegations of fraud underpinning the brokerdealer's failure,224 furnishing SIPC with experience in dealing with
broker-dealers whose cultures may also make them prone to claims from
their customers.225 In addition to administering liquidations, SIPC has
further familiarity with failing broker-dealers because of the reports226it
receives with respect to these broker-dealers from the SEC and SROs.
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (2005) (members of SIPC "shall be all persons
registered as brokers or dealers under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act"). Exceptions are
limited to persons whose principal business is conducted outside of the United States and
persons whose business consists of the distribution of shares of registered open end
investment companies or unit investment trusts; the sale of variable annuities, the
business of insurance or the business of rendering investment advisory services to one or
more registered investment companies or insurance company separate accounts. Id.
221. Id. § 78ccc(c)(2)(C)(i). The three such directors are required not to be from
the same geographical area. Id.
222. The 228 SIPC-administered liquidations that occurred between 1971 and 1991
amounted to about just one percent of the 20,344 SIPC members that went out of
business or failed. GAO 1992, supra note 143, at 22.
223. Through 2004, SIPC had handled 313 proceedings under SIPA since its
inception. Of these, 276 have been completed, 28 involved pending litigation matters,
and claims in 9 are being processed. Two proceedings were initiated in 2004. SIPC 2004
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137. SIPC has received criticism for failing in certain
respects to protect investors. In a 2001 report, GAO found among other things that SIPC
and the SEC had failed adequately to inform investors of the importance of documenting
unauthorized trading complaints. GAO SIPC STEPS, supra note 59, at 8. In subsequent
reports, GAO found that SIPC and the SEC had largely implemented GAO's
recommendations to fix this and other problems. GAO SIPC UPDATE, supra note 39, at
2-5; GAO 2004 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 93, at 2-3.
224. See GAO 1992, supra note 143, at 29 ("SIPC has had to liquidate 228 firms.
SIPC officials estimate that fraud-which can prove difficult for the regulators to
detect-was involved in more than half of the 228 liquidations and accounted for about
81% of SIPC's $236 million in liquidation expenses as of December 31, 1991 .").
225. Leading types of controversies involved in arbitration claims in 2004 were
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, misrepresentation, failure to supervise, unsuitability
and omission of facts. See NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 9.
226. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 4. In Barbour,the Supreme
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While SIPC has a lean staff of about thirty,22 7 the agency expands
its effective staff size when it handles larger liquidations.2 28 Thus, SIPC
has experience in managing a greater workload than its everyday size
implies. In any case, the added burden from handling unpaid awards is
unlikely to be great relative to the volume of claims that SIPC has
handled. For instance, through 2004, SIPC had satisfied 623,300
customer claims in completed or substantially completed cases during its
(then) 34-year history.2 29 In just one recent liquidation, albeit the largest
in SIPC history, there were 173,465 customers receiving distributions
(this liquidation, for MJK Clearing Inc., was initiated in late 200 1).230
These numbers are much greater than the roughly 150 NASD arbitration
cases each year (at the recent, provisional rate) that result in an unpaid
Moreover, as unpaid awards have already been "adjudicated,"
award.2
the increased administrative workload (as opposed to financial burden)
from SIPC assuming the new responsibility is likely to be slight.232 In
addition, because SIPC also oversees the liquidation of the general estate
of a failed broker-dealer, it presumably has already had the experience of
handling unpaid awards. (Although, ironically, such experience may be
less than expected because the general estate is frequently exhausted by a
SIPC-administered liquidation before general creditor claims such as
unpaid awards are satisfied. )233
Finally, it may be that SIPC is currently underutilized. In its early
years, in the immediate aftermath of the back office crisis, as many as 40
SIPA proceedings were initiated in a year.234 Since then, there have only
been 10 or more proceedings per year, approximately every five years.

Court noted that SIPC "maintains an early-warning system and monitors the affairs of
any firm that it is given reason to believe may be in danger of failure." Secs. Investor
Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975).
227. SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2004),
available at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/2003_Annual report.pdf.
228. Joo, supra note 4, at 1117 ("Larger liquidations require the retention of a
professional trustee, attorneys, consultants, and accountants, as well as an administrative
staff.").
229. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 7.
230. Id. at 23; see also SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP., 2001 ANNUAL
REPORT 6 (2002), available at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/SIPCAnnualReport02.pdf.

231. See supra text accompanying note 22.
232. However, payment of claims account by account can be a relatively timeconsuming process. See GAO 1992, supra note 137, at 33.

233. See Joo, supra note 4. at 1118-20; see also supra notes 217-18 and
accompanying text.
234. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 6.
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In 2004, SIPC had just two proceedings commenced.23 5 Such numbers,
while a proxy for actual workload, may indicate that SIPC is ready to
take on new responsibilities.
The United Kingdom offers an example of a publicly-created body,
the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), operating in a
fashion that is (roughly) similar to how an expanded SIPC might
function, but on a much grander scale. The FSCS is the result of a
fundamental reordering of Britain's financial regulatory regime.23 6 The
purpose of this reordering was to centralize regulatory functions, and to
take a more pro-active stance toward protecting consumers of financial
services products.2 37 With respect to investments of the type that would
result in unpaid arbitration awards, the FSCS provides compensation to
investors with valid claims against a defunct broker-dealer in amounts of
up to £48,000 (about $82,000).238 The FSCS also covers a wider range
of financial services products, such as bank deposits and mortgage
loans, 239 and a broader class of claims. For instance, permissible claims
concerning investments include those for "bad investment advice, poor
investment management or misrepresentation., 240 The most important
235. Id.
236. The FSCS was established pursuant to the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000 (FSMA), a sweeping piece of legislation designed to modernize financial regulation
and centralize supervisory functions in a single regulator, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA). Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom and
United States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern FinancialMarkets, 38
TEX. INT'L L.J. 317, 329, 331 (2003). FSMA regulates activities including deposit
taking, safekeeping of assets, and managing investments and providing investment
advice. Id. at 330. The FSCS unified and replaced separate schemes for banks, building
societies, insurance companies and securities and investment firms previously operated
by separate regulators. Id. at 331.
237. FSMA rejected the traditional British approach of protection based solely on
accurate disclosure and instead has sought to protect financial consumers from perils such
as firm collapse, risk of fraud, misrepresentation and unsuitability. Id. at 334.
238. Financial Services Compensation Scheme, Compensation Limits, http://fscs.
org.uk/consumer/keyfacts/limitations of The Scheme/compensation limits (last visited
Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter FSCS Limits]. Interestingly, in February 2004, SIPC and
FSCS signed a memorandum of understanding providing for increased cooperation in the
event of the failure of a broker-dealer operating in both the United States and the United
Kingdom. See Press Release, Securities Investor Protection Corp., SIPC and Canadian
Counterpart to Coordinate on Brokerage Firm Insolvencies in North America (Apr. 13,
2005), http://www.sipc.org/media/releasel3April05.cfm (noting that SIPC and FSCS had
previously signed a similar accord).
239. In addition to investments, the FSCS provides maximum compensation of
£31,700 per person for deposits and £48,000 per person for mortgage advice and
arranging, among other compensations. FSCS Limits, supra note 238.
240. Financial Services Compensation Scheme, When FSCS Is Triggered,
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point, however, is that the British approach provides support for seeking
to protect investors who, through no fault of their own, suffer losses
because a broker-dealer ceases business. This approach also suggests
that an entity analogous to an expanded SIPC can operate in a manner
that does not create negative economic effects.24'
Fourth, SIPC possesses a sizeable fund that could be immediately
applied to unpaid awards. At the end of 2004, the "SIPC Fund," which
finances SIPC's expenditures, 242 stood at about $1.29 billion. 243 SIPC's
experience in raising the monies for and managing a fund of this size
again suggests that it would have the appropriate expertise for handling
unpaid awards.
Critics of using the SIPC fund have argued that it would be quickly
exhausted.244 And they have argued that once the fund was depleted, its
replenishment would unfairly depend on monies extracted from wellcapitalized brokers who are not delinquent in paying arbitration
awards.24 5
However, a closer look suggests that these criticisms are unjustified.
The $1.29 billion fund is being maintained at a de minimis cost to SIPC's
broker-dealer membership. The annual assessment for each broker246
dealer, no matter how large, is currently $150, the statutory minimum.
SIPC has levied this de minimis amount every year since 1996.247
Indeed, in 2004, SIPC derived only $1 million from its member
assessments compared with $63.1 million from investments.2 48 The $1
million in aggregate member assessments is a miniscule fraction of the
http://fscs.org.uk/consumer/keyfacts/limitations-of the scheme/when fscs is triggered
(last visited Dec. 12, 2005).
241. In December 2004, the Office of Fair Trading, Britain's antitrust agency,
released a report reviewing the FSMA's impact on the markets to which it applies,
including the market defined as "brokerage and fund management services for private
customers." The report found that the FSMA had not had a negative impact on the
structure of competition in these markets. Oxera, Competition Review of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Nov., 2004), available at http://www.oft.
gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/ODE3DC25-5575-4361-83F086F76F4F318 l/0/oft757.pdf

(Report

prepared for the Office of Fair Trading). The report did not specifically address the
functioning of the reimbursement scheme but rather was focused on whether the
heightened regulatory costs associated with the act had deterred new entrants. See id.
242. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(a)(1) (2005).
243. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 3.
244. GAO 2000, supra note 6, at 41.
245. Id.
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c)(1) (2005) (setting statutory minimum assessment).
247. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 9.

248. Id. at 8.
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securities industry's pre-tax profit (forecast) of $19.5 billion in 2004.249
Just half of the yearly amount generated by SIPC's investments would
satisfy the estimated $30 million or so of unpaid arbitration awards in
2004.250 Thus, rather than deplete the fund, a new responsibility for
unpaid awards is more likely to diminish the fund's growth, if the current
minimum assessment level were to be maintained. And, in any event,
SIPC's operations are unlikely to be strained by paying for unpaid
awards: SIPC, the organization, costs comparatively little to operate,
with just $11 million in expenses last year.2 5'
In the past, SIPC has been able to increase the size of its fund rather
quickly. After a decision by the SIPC board, the fund amount was raised
to $1 billion in 1996 from $653 million in 1991, a gain of more than 50%
in five years.25 2 Similarly, the liquidation of MJK Clearing required
SIPC to make net advances of $75.2 million from the liquidation's
inception in September, 2001 through December 31, 2004.253 Yet,
during this period, and even as it made advances to customers because of
other liquidations, SIPC was able to continue with its de minimis
assessment rate. Even if SIPC were simply to fund the elimination of
unpaid awards each year through direct assessments, the per-member
cost would amount to roughly $5000.254

Moreover, the manner of

assessment as it pertains to payment for unpaid awards could be
modified if necessary to ensure fairness among broker-dealers, perhaps
in a fashion that better reflects a broker-dealer's risk of generating
249. Securities Industry Association, Research/Statistics (last updated January 13,
2005), http://www.sia.com/research/html/keyindustrytrends-html#pretax.
250. See supra note 25.
251. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 13 (the figure for expenses is
about $20 million if a provision for estimated costs to complete customer protection
proceedings in progress is included).
252. See GAO SIPC UPDATE, supra note 37, at 8 n.l 1 (fund balance reached $1
billion in 1996); GAO 1992, supra note 143, at 18 (decision to raise fund to $1 billion
made in 1991; fund size at $653 million on Dec. 31, 1991); Order Approving Proposed
Bylaw Change Relating to SIPC Fund Assessments on SIPC Members, Exchange Act
Release No. SIPA-157, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,145 (Nov. 27, 1991) (approving change in SIPC
assessment formula and target fund balance of $1 billion). Between 1992 and 1995, the
assessment rate varied, but never exceeded 0.1% of members' net operating revenues; in
1996 (and thereafter), the assessment rate was set at the statutory minimum of $150 per
member. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 9.
253. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 25. The annual report noted
that the MJK Clearing net advance exceeded the net advances in the 228 smallest
proceedings combined. Id. at 7.
254. This figure is roughly the sum that would be required if each of SIPC's 6,153
members, id. at 8, were to make an equal payment' towards defraying an estimated $30
million of yearly unpaid awards.
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unpaid awards. SIPC could take as a starting point the wide range of
factors SIPA authorizes it to consider in making general member
assessments.2 55
As the foregoing suggests, the risk posed to the SIPC fund by the
assumption of an unpaid awards burden is inconsiderable. The current
level of $1.29 billion is conservative in comparison with SIPC's
historical needs. Through 2004, SIPC had expended just $570.1 million
on liquidation proceedings during its 34-year history. 256 Thus, the
current fund level, maintained with minimum statutory assessments, is
more than twice all the monies SIPC has expended on customer claims
since its inception. In addition to the fund, SIPC can, if necessary, draw
upon both a $1 billion line of credit with the U.S. Treasury, as well as a
$1 billion revolving line of credit with a consortium of banks.2 57 In the
event of a market "break," multiple billion-dollar plus broker-dealers
failures might occur, but in such an extreme event, many other entities
are likely to be involved in addition to SIPC. 258 In any case, the marginal

added burden of dealing with unpaid awards is unlikely to have
diminished SIPC's capacity to respond to unexpected financial burdens.
Increasing the burden on broker-dealers, and even responsible
broker-dealers, because of an expanded SIPC mission is likely to be
perceived as even more palatable to the extent that SIPC operates as a
subsidy to the securities industry. As noted, SIPC has a $1 billion line of
255. In determining member assessments, SIPC may consider: "the amount or
composition of [a broker-dealer's] gross revenues from the securities business, the
number or dollar volume of transactions effected by them, the number of customer
accounts maintained by them or the amounts of cash and securities in such accounts, their
net capital, the nature of their activities (whether in the securities business or otherwise)
and the consequent risks, or other relevant factors." 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c)(2) (2005).

Appropriately weighing these factors, such as both gross revenues and the nature of a
broker's activities, might enable SIPC to devise a system with improved fairness.
256. Of this sum, $374.5 million represented customer advances, while $195.5
million represented administration expenses. SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
137, at 7.
257. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(g)-(h) (2005); SIPC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137,
at 14. A 1992 GAO study discussed, among other things, the adequacy of SIPC's fund
with respect to possible future demands such as the failure of a large broker-dealer. GAO
1992, supra note 143, at 40-46. The study concluded that SIPC had adopted a
responsible approach (setting a fund target sufficient to handle the liquidation of the
largest broker-dealer in the industry) but that certainty was impossible and success
ultimately depended the regulatory framework including the financial responsibility rules.
Id. at 5, 43-46. More recently, SIPC said that "the adequacy of SIPC's financial
resources is under constant review at all levels of the Corporation." SIPC 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 137, at 3.
258. See GAO 1992, supra note 143, at 44.
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credit from the U.S. Treasury; the SIPC Fund, moreover, is not taxed.259
The prospective "bailout" SIPC provides for broker-dealers in the event
of their failure increases consumer confidence and therefore boosts
business volume.26 ° It is possible that this bailout "insurance" is
provided at a discount.26 1
SIPC's mode of liquidation, in paying for the expenses of a
liquidation of a broker-dealer out of the general estate, boosts the brokerdealer industry at the expense of investors and general creditors (because
otherwise these expenses would be borne by SIPC and thus the
industry). 262 SIPC notes that over the course of its 34-year history
through 2004, cash and securities distributed for the accounts of
customers totaled approximately $14.2 billion. Of that amount, $375
million came from the SIPC Fund, but $13.8 billion came from debtors'
estates.263 In the absence of SIPA (and the preference it accords to
certain broker-dealer customers), those billions might have been
distributed in greater proportion to general creditors (both customers and
other creditors). Thus, if SIPC has the effect of subsidizing brokerdealers generally, it would be fair to ask broker-dealers to pay more for
an expanded SIPC that satisfies unpaid arbitration awards.
d. Drafting Concerns in Amending SIPA
A key concern in revising SIPA to incorporate unpaid awards would
be to include those awards arising outside of a SIPC-administered
liquidation, since most awards are likely to be generated in other
circumstances. 264 A worthwhile approach would be to provide a separate
section dealing with unpaid awards.26 5 Setting the amending language
259. 15 U.S.C. § 78kkk(e) (2005).
260. Joo, supra note 4, at 1106; see also SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co., 498 F.2d
978, 984 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974) ("To the extent that SIPA encourages the investor to stay in
the market, it contributes to the well-being of the brokerage community" (citation
omitted)).
261. Joo, supra note 4, at 1115.
262. Id. at 1121.

263. SIPC 2004

ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 137, at 6.

264. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (SIPC-administered liquidations
amount to just one percent of all broker-dealer terminations of NASD membership).
265. See generally Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa78111 (2005). The new section might follow immediately after § 78fff, as § 78fff sets
forth the general provisions of a SIPC-administered liquidation proceeding including
payment of customers. The placement of the new section would thus emphasize the
section's similar operative nature (in the sense of dealing with and paying for claims).
The preceding sections are either of general applicability or else, in the case of § 78eee,
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apart would emphasize that the language is intended to operate beyond
the confines of the SIPC-administered liquidation. It would also lessen
the risk of interpretive ambiguities that might arise where language was
grafted onto a section that had been focused solely on such a liquidation.
Another important concern would be to determine the appropriate
coverage amounts. Likely options include: (a) unlimited coverage; (b)
coverage that would include all but the largest unpaid awards (say, a
ceiling of $500,000); (c) coverage targeted at a round number that
included much but not all of an average unpaid award (say, $100,000);
(d) or limited coverage (say, $20,000 to $50,000). Settling upon an
appropriate amount would involve weighing various considerations. For
instance, if one were concerned about the aggregate burden to be
imposed upon SIPC, or desirous of restricting coverage to claim amounts
typically brought by less well-heeled investors, one might seek a lower
level of protection. Similarly, a wish to avoid "moral hazard" types of
behavior might also militate in favor of less protection.2 66 On the other
hand, if one wanted to cover most unpaid awards, it would make sense to
provide for coverage at some level substantially above an average unpaid
award amount (of a projected $174,000 in 2004).267 Coverage of up to
$500,000 would have an appealing symmetry with the overall limit
provided for elsewhere in SIPA with respect to customer claims for net
268
equity.
Related to the appropriate level of coverage is deciding how to pay
for the coverage. Amending language should provide for direct payment
of unpaid awards from the SIPC Fund, as opposed to first exhausting the

pertain more specifically to § 78fff. Thus, § 78aaa provides a short title, § 78bbb
provides for incorporation of the Act into the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, §
78ccc provides for the creation, membership, and powers of SIPC, and § 78ddd
establishes the SIPC Fund and sets up the assessment scheme. In addition, § 78eee

provides for the "protection of customers," meaning the identification of a failing brokerdealer and appointment of a trustee to administer the liquidation provided for in § 78fff.
Likewise, the sections that would come after the new section are also of general
applicability. Thus, current § 78ggg refers to various SEC oversight functions, § 78hhh
provides for the filing of information to make member assessments, § 78iii establishes
roles for SROs such as the collection of dues, § 78jjj details various prohibited acts, §
78kkk contains various miscellaneous provisions, and, finally, § 78111, provides for
definitions.
266. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing "moral hazard").
267. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
268. Statistical analysis of the distribution of unpaid awards would provide a more
precise method of arriving at the proper coverage amount, if something short of unlimited
coverage were desired.
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broker-dealer's estate.2 69 Such an approach would be necessary as well
as equitable given that most unpaid awards would arise other than
through a SIPC-administered liquidation. 270 The amending language
would also have to provide a mechanism for the presentment to the
appropriate SIPC official (as distinguished from the trustee appointed
pursuant to the SIPC liquidation process) of a claim for unpaid awards.
It probably would not be necessary to enhance SIPC's ability to
raise money to pay for unpaid awards. First, SIPC appears already to
have enough statutory authority to raise the funds that would be needed
to cover unpaid awards. For instance, §78ddd (pertaining to the SIPC
Fund) gives to SIPC a broad authority to set assessment levels. 27'
Second, as described in Section D.3.c, SIPC has been able to maintain a
fund of more than $1 billion based on statutory minimum assessments of
$150 per member. Third, the reduced non-payment rate means that the
aggregate cost of paying for arbitration claims is not likely to be as large
as it once might have been.
New definitions would follow almost inevitably from the inclusion
of a new, separate section dealing with unpaid awards, especially as most
of these awards are likely to arise outside the bounds of a SIPCadministered liquidation proceeding. Such new definitions would also
better ensure that the amending language does not intrude upon SIPC's
core function (of liquidating certain failed brokers) and would avoid
potential complexities that might arise because the pre-existing terms
have already been litigated in and defined by the courts.
For instance, a new term for "client," would avoid using the term
"customer" in dealing with unpaid awards (important because
"customer" has already been the subject of much interpretation). 272 And,
in any case, another new term, for "unpaid arbitration award," would also
be necessary.

269. See supra notes 184, 217-18 and accompanying text.

270. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c)(2) (2005) ("SIPC shall, by bylaw, impose upon its
members such assessments as, after consultation with self-regulatory organizations, SIPC
may deem necessary and appropriate to establish and maintain the fund .... "). However,
SEC approval is required for SIPC's bylaw changes to become effective. See id. §
78ccc(e).
272. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, § 8-B-5(b) ("The scope of the SIPA, in
large part, turns on the definition of 'customer."'); Id. at n.417; Harbeck, supra note 184,
at 285 ("It therefore comes as no surprise that the 'customer' definition has been the
subject of a significant body of case law."). In 1978, the definition of "customer" was
modified to codify several elements of case law. Id. at 280 n. 17.
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As the foregoing indicates, while amending the statute is not
without its complexities, it nonetheless should prove possible to do.
E. Conclusion
The problem of unpaid securities arbitration awards, and the
damage it causes to many individual investors, both deserves to be and
can be solved with relative ease.
In recent years, NASD has taken significant steps to address the
problem with the apparent exception of making public up-to-date,
comprehensive statistics on its extent. 273 These steps, such as requiring

brokerage firms to certify compliance with awards, have apparently
helped to halve the non-payment rate.
Nonetheless, good reasons exist for seeking a further reduction that
would bring the rate to near zero. Even as so far improved, the problem
in absolute terms remains sizeable. Possibly more than 150 investors or
investor households will have failed to receive their substantial awards in
a given year even after having gone through the time and expense of
pursuing and vindicating a claim. This significant non-payment rate,
especially in light of the regulator-supervised nature of the arbitration
process, has the potential to undermine confidence in the capital markets.
A system of investor justice in which many investors are completely
stymied after the system affirms their claims is not a system that inspires
trust. Conversely, a system of investor justice refined to guarantee
payment of legitimate claims would highlight the outstanding quality of
the U.S. capital markets.
Arguing against a fix to the problem on the basis of cost, such as
increased broker-dealer expenses, amounts to unfair burden shifting. As
a practical matter, such arguments are less compelling now to the extent
that the non-payment rate has been reduced (because the overall burden
of the fix is proportionately reduced). Moreover, cost-based arguments
are equivalent to saying that the burden of an imperfectly functioning
arbitration payment system is better to be borne by a randomly chosen
selection of unlucky investors rather than parties, broker-dealers or
investors in the aggregate, that are much better situated to absorb this
burden. The unfairness is made more acute because the securities
arbitration system retains an element of compulsion and because the
273. Again, as discussed at supra note 40, developing and making publicly
available detailed, up-to-date statistics would help to delineate the extent of the problem
and also draw attention to it, especially since the number of arbitration claims has risen.
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system is supervised by regulators.
Enough time has passed to judge that while the more procedural,
"inexpensive" reforms implemented by NASD have proven very helpful,
direct compensatory steps are necessary to reduce further or even
eliminate the non-payment problem.
Moreover, it is doubtful that investor vigilance would be lessened in
any meaningful fashion if a last-resort compensatory scheme for their
valid claims were to be established. Most investors are, for obvious
reasons, far less able than regulators to ascertain whether or not a
particular broker-dealer is likely to fail. It seems unjust to expect that
individual investors would have the resources or ability to make a
forward-looking judgment as to the future financial viability of a brokerdealer. Indeed, if it were even possible for individual investors to
correctly make such a judgment through inquiries like reviewing
disciplinary records, then why would not regulators be in a better
position to identify and protect against the irresponsible broker-dealers
likely to default on arbitration awards? An inquiry that investors might
undertake today, but not tomorrow, because of a last-resort
compensatory scheme is unlikely to prove especially helpful.
Good options exist for further reducing or even eliminating the
problem of unpaid awards. These options include establishing a separate
SRO-administered fund, or a bonding or insurance requirement, and
deserve further exploration. NASD would be an obvious candidate for
administering a last-resort payment scheme given that it has manifold
experience in supervising or assisting in the liquidation of broker-dealers,
and given that it oversees the most extensive arbitration system.
Likewise, the provision of excess SIPC insurance indicates that a market
for insurance for unpaid awards could function.
Enhancing the Net Capital Rule is another worthwhile approach.
The low minimum requirements suggest that the rule could be toughened
in a way that better facilitates orderly liquidation of failed broker-dealers,
while at the same time leaving more money over to pay for general
creditor claims, including unpaid awards, than is currently the case. The
low minimums (as little as just $5000) further suggest that the economic
hardship on most broker-dealers is likely to be slight if the minimums
were to be raised by less than orders of magnitude. Incorporating an
escrow provision with respect to unpaid awards would provide a targeted
means for reducing or eliminating such awards. In either case, the
historical nexus between the rule and SIPA, and the complementary
manner in which the rule and SIPC are intended to operate, provides a
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further justification for updating the rule where broader principles such
as investor confidence are at stake.
Finally, SIPA and SIPC are attractive vehicles for addressing unpaid
arbitration awards for a variety of reasons. SIPA was enacted on the
basis of concerns similar to those that would motivate rectifying the
problem of unpaid awards. These concerns include a desire to protect
investors whose assets are at risk because of a broker-dealer's failure.
SIPA establishes a precedent of special treatment for such investors
where broader systemic concerns are at issue. In SIPA's case, those
concerns relate particularly to maintaining confidence in broker-dealers
and the capital markets. A SIPA amended to cover unpaid awards would
have broader concerns that also included the related goal of improving
the process of investor justice.
At a practical level, SIPC makes sense as an entity for dealing with
unpaid awards because it already exists. There would be no need for a
new enabling statute or the establishment of a new bureaucratic entity,
but rather amendments to an existing statute and additions to the
responsibilities of an existing entity. SIPC, moreover, already has the
relevant expertise because it oversees the liquidation of certain bankrupt
broker-dealers. And, while SIPC has a lean staff, it has expanded its
effective size for larger liquidations, giving it experience with having
greater responsibilities.
SIPC has a sizeable fund of more than $1 billion. These monies
could be immediately applied to satisfy unpaid awards. Moreover,
SIPC's assessments on its member firms could be raised, especially as
these assessments have been set for many years at a minimal level. Part
of the rationale for raising assessment levels would rest on an
understanding that SIPC serves as an indirect subsidy to the brokerdealer industry, and that a marginally increased SIPC assessment would
constitute a fair compensation for this subsidy. Amending SIPA to give
SIPC enhanced powers that would allow it to cover unpaid arbitration
awards does not seem insurmountable from a technical drafting point of
view. A key consideration would be how to incorporate unpaid awards
arising outside of a SIPC-administered liquidation.
Perfecting the securities arbitration payment process to the point
where individual investors who pursued regulator-sanctioned procedures
did not face the random prospect of losing their savings would showcase
the excellence of the U.S. capital markets. Such a "fix" is, moreover,
within ready grasp: in particular, through an overdue revision to the Net
Capital Rule and an easily-accomplished expansion of SIPC's
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responsibilities.
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